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Courts as Information Intermediaries: 
A Case Study of Sovereign Debt Disputes 
Sadie Blanchard* 
It’s well known there’s always two sides, if no more; else who’d go 
to law, I should like to know? 
— George Eliot, Middlemarch (1872) 
When foreign sovereigns default on their debt, creditors sometimes sue 
them. These creditors are sophisticated actors, and they know that if they 
sue, courts can do little to force a sovereign to satisfy a judgment. Why do 
they sue? This Article argues that these creditors sue because they use 
litigation to produce information about the debtor state or its government 
that induces third parties to sanction or refuse to deal with the state or the 
government. The ability to produce such information strengthens the 
litigating creditors’ bargaining position in settlement negotiations. 
Courts thus serve as information intermediaries that strengthen 
reputational enforcement in the international sovereign debt market. The 
Article presents a case study that includes interviews with market 
participants and their lawyers to show three ways in which courts play 
this informational role. First, courts publicly determine whether a 
sovereign debtor has violated its legal obligations to creditors. Second, 
through discovery and fact finding, courts mitigate information 
asymmetries concerning aspects of sovereign behavior related to default 
that are difficult to monitor. Third, they provide a forum in which creditors 
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seek to recast the broader political and ethical dimensions of disputes by 
highlighting corruption by the debtor state government. The sovereign 
debt market thus relies on a hybrid of legal and nonlegal enforcement. 
Parties appeal to the law to determine rights, detect bad behavior, and 
provide a broad normative frame. At the same time, they depend on 
reputation to discourage violations. This finding has implications for the 
debate among contracts scholars about the extent to which nonlegal 
mechanisms such as reputation can support trade. Recognizing that 
courts can function as information intermediaries implies that courts can 
expand the range of markets that reputation can support. Under certain 
conditions, courts can supplement legal remedies by transmitting accurate 
and credible information about market participants’ expectations 
and behavior.
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INTRODUCTION 
Contracts scholars debate the extent to which nonlegal 
enforcement mechanisms can support market transactions. Dispute 
resolution in the international sovereign debt market offers new 
insights into this question. Because creditors can rarely collect on 
judgments against foreign sovereigns, researchers studying the 
international sovereign debt market largely assume that law 
matters little to its functioning.1 Yet creditors sometimes spend 
millions of dollars and many years suing sovereigns that default. 
Investors buy distressed sovereign debt—loans and bonds on 
which a sovereign has already defaulted or will imminently 
default—with the apparent intention of pursuing litigation to 
recover it. If law does not matter, why do they do this? This Article 
argues that the seemingly toothless right to sue debtor states 
supports reputational enforcement in the international sovereign 
debt market. 
Scholars have long recognized the sovereign debt market as 
part of a vast terrain of commercial relationships governed by 
nonlegal mechanisms. In the sovereign debt literature, the 
dominant view is that law and courts are unimportant to sustaining 
sovereign lending.2 Explanations for the successful operation of this 
market focus on reputational costs, retaliation measures such as 
trade sanctions, and the economic and political costs of default.3 
 
 1. See Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and 
Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 651, 659–64 (2009) (describing the debate in 
the economics literature over whether law, reputation, or nonlegal sanctions explain why 
sovereigns repay and how the sovereign debt market can exist). 
 2. In recent work, Mark Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati point out that law plays a larger 
role than is generally assumed in structuring the sovereign borrower-lender relationship. See 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Relevance of Law to Sovereign Debt, 11 ANN. REV. 
L. SOC. SCI. 395 (2015) [hereinafter Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law]. Prior to their 
work, law was viewed as relevant only to the extent that it enables creditors to impose costs 
on sovereigns through legal harassment. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, 
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 57 (2009); Andrei Shleifer, Will 
the Sovereign Debt Markets Survive?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 87 (2003) (“[L]enders have no 
power. . . . [T]here are no courts with authority over sovereign states whose mandate is to 
protect the interest of creditors.”). 
 3. See Panizza et al., supra note 1; Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law, supra 
note 2. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff are the most prominent proponents of the 
argument that trade sanctions are a major force in incentivizing sovereigns to repay loans. 
See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 57. Michael Tomz, on the other hand, finds little 
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Some recent scholarship ascribes a more important role to law but 
only because, in particular, unusual recent cases, courts have 
implemented effective sanctions on sovereign debtors.4 Scholars of 
and practitioners in the sovereign debt market widely share the 
assumption that law and courts matter only to the extent that they 
enable confiscation of assets.5 Although courts offer creditors a 
better prospect of sanctioning debtors today than they did in 
the past, scholars, market participants, and lawyers who highlight 
the growing role of formal sanctions acknowledge that they 
remain weak.6 
 
evidence of retaliatory trade sanctions against defaulting countries. See MICHAEL TOMZ, 
REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 158–95 (2007). 
 4. See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 655–59 (surveying creditors’ enforcement efforts 
and concluding that legal enforceability of sovereign debt remains minimal); W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31 YALE J. REG. 189, 206–
08 (2014) (describing the enforcement mechanism as a “court-imposed embargo” that 
hinders the ability of a sovereign to transact with third parties for fear of asset confiscation).  
 5. See Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 659 (“[T]he main difference between corporate 
and sovereign debt is the lack of a straightforward legal mechanism to enforce repayment of 
the latter. In the event of default, legal penalties or remedies do exist, but they are much more 
limited than at the corporate level. This leads to the question of why debt nonetheless tends 
to be repaid, and why a sovereign debt market can exist.”); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 
2, at 53–58 (calling the lack of an effective legal enforcement mechanism against sovereigns 
“the most fundamental ‘imperfection’ of international capital markets” and describing 
alternative incentive devices: institutional mechanisms, defined as the threat of asset seizures 
abroad, and reputational mechanisms, defined as the threat of lost future access to credit). 
Reinhart and Rogoff equate reputational theories with the view that institutions, including 
courts, do not matter. See id. at 55–56. While Reinhart and Rogoff argue that the threat of 
asset seizures incentivizes debt repayment by posing a blockade risk to the country’s foreign 
trade, they acknowledge the insufficiency of this mechanism to explain “the scale and size 
of international lending or the diversity of measures creditors bring to bear in real-life default 
situations.” Id. at 57. 
 6. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign 
Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 157 (1989) (“[L]enders may hold the stick of being able to impose 
sanctions that will impede trade and financial market transactions. However, . . . the 
vulnerable assets held abroad by most LDCs are trivial relative to the amounts they owe.”); 
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017) (describing how Argentina’s 
creditors pursued it around the world for over a decade and had some of the world’s most 
sophisticated lawyers yet recovered very little through court enforcement, that trust 
structures are used to structure new debt issuances to avoid vulnerability to attachment, and 
that major commodity-exporting countries like Venezuela are more vulnerable to formal 
enforcement); Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017) (stating that 
confiscating assets of a commodity exporting state like Venezuela is very difficult because 
most of the assets are owned not by the state but by a corporation that is a separate 
legal person). 
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Professionals I interviewed who have decades of experience in 
the sovereign debt market struggled to reconcile their conviction 
that the law and courts are weak and unimportant in this market 
with the fact that investors do indeed sue and do so aggressively at 
great expense. For example, one person who has worked in the 
secondary market of sovereign debt for decades emphasized the 
weakness of courts. He explained that in enforcement litigation, “no 
one was very successful[; i]t wasn’t the solution[,]” and discovery 
efforts were “a hill of beans in the end” because they did not lead 
to successful asset seizures.7 He then averred that the “threat of 
litigation does move mountains” and concluded, “I don’t want to 
leave off with litigation is worthless, useless. I think it does keep 
people honest.”8 A senior lawyer who has defended sovereigns in 
litigation described the legal situation starkly: “[T]he people who 
buy these bonds better realize they are essentially unenforceable 
and based on the good will of the countries. Essentially, they are 
unenforceable. It’s voluntary enforcement by the debtor.”9 These 
remarks seem paradoxical: how can the threat of litigation “keep 
people honest” when experience demonstrates that states can so 
effectively elude creditors?10 
If much of the sovereign debt literature and many sovereign 
debt market participants are skeptical of courts’ effectiveness, then 
much of the scholarship on informal contract enforcement could be 
described as hostile toward courts. Informal governance is, after all, 
about “opting out of the legal system.”11 The literature highlights 
the weaknesses of courts: their inability to provide adequate 
remedies, their tendency to apply disfavored rules and interpretive 
methods, their lack of commercial expertise, and their costliness.12 
 
 7. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer VI (Aug. 22, 2017). 
   10. See Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017). 
 11. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). In more recent work, Professor Bernstein 
has explored how formal contracting can “create a space in which private order can flourish.” 
Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 561 (2015). 
 12. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1820 n.167 (1996); Bernstein, 
Opting Out, supra note 11; David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 
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In this literature, adjudication usually takes the form of private 
arbitration, in which privately created rules are applied to decide 
disputes between repeat players operating in closed networks.13 
When courts are discussed, it is usually to explain how they 
undermine private ordering.14 In short, neither the literature on in-
formal contract governance nor the scholarship on sovereign 
debt has much explored how courts might support informal 
contract enforcement.15 
This Article examines just that question. In light of the 
voluminous scholarship portraying courts and informal enforce-
ment as alternatives, the choice by participants in the sovereign 
debt market to opt in to courts appears somewhat mysterious. 
Certain facts deepen the mystery. There are already robust 
 
HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990) (treating “Third-Party Decisionmaking with Reputational Enforce-
ment” as coextensive with opting out of courts; cataloguing reasons courts are unsuitable 
adjudicators for commercial transactions); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private 
Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Bernstein,  
Merchant Law, supra note 12; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 11. 
 14. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 12, at 1820 n.167; Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva 
Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of 
Innovation, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 981, 998 (recounting interview respondents’ intentions to avoid 
litigation at almost any cost, despite their intensive use of formal contracts to coordinate 
“innovation-oriented” relationships); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 541–619 (2003) (viewing informal and 
formal contract governance as alternatives); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2003) (“[L]egal liability . . . may . . . 
‘crowd out’ . . . self-enforcing mechanisms.”). 
 15. There are two recent exceptions. A study published in 2016 by Gillian Hadfield 
and Iva Bozovic considers the role of formal contract institutions in informal enforcement, 
but courts are not a focus of their study. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 14, at 1011–12. 
They find that parties in “innovation-oriented” commercial relationships make intensive use 
of formal contracts but rely on informal enforcement, primarily through the threat of 
terminating an ongoing relationship. See id. Gilson, Sabel, and Scott examine how formal 
enforcement with mild sanctions might complement informal enforcement. Ronald J. Gilson, 
Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting 
in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010). However, courts can sanction 
violations of some of the obligations in their study. See id. In the case of sovereign debt 
contracts, none of the obligations can reliably be enforced with traditional remedies, though 
all can be adjudicated. See id. Sovereign bond contracts do not look like the highly relational 
contracts for innovation studied by Hadfield and Bozovic and Gilson, Sabel, and Scott. 
Similarly, Edward B. Rock has theorized reputation as a key mechanism by which the courts 
of Delaware discourage bad behavior by corporate executives, but his study focuses on the 
law of fiduciaries and corporate governance rather than contract disputes. See Edward B. 
Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). 
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institutions acting in this market to discover and disseminate 
information about sovereign borrowers’ behavior, including the 
International Monetary Fund (the IMF), other multilateral financial 
institutions, and credit rating agencies. This Article offers a theory 
of what courts do that is distinctive and valuable to contracting 
parties in this market, adding to a nascent literature examining the 
role of law and courts in the sovereign debt market.16 
Even though courts usually cannot enforce debtor states’ 
obligations through conventional judicial means, they play a key 
role in the sovereign debt market. Courts are important players 
because they produce information that has the power to provoke 
reactions by third parties that are costly for the debtor or its agents. 
Creditors litigate because revealing such information through the 
courts strengthens a creditor’s leverage in settlement negotiations. 
Courts serve three information-providing functions. First, when 
complex legal issues arise between the parties, courts determine 
whether the state has breached its obligations to the creditor.17 Such 
legal determinations affect third-party assessments of the state’s 
riskiness as a borrower. Second, discovery and judicial fact-finding 
mitigate information asymmetries about debtor behavior during 
default and restructuring.18 Third, courts provide a platform in 
which creditors can recast the dispute’s political and ethical 
implications, offering an alternative account of their own behavior 
and that of the debtor state’s government.19 Sovereign bond 
enforcement thus employs a hybrid enforcement mechanism in 
which formal judicial process and informal, third-party sanctions 
interact to make reputational governance more effective.20 
 
 16. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, International Finance and Sovereign Debt, 
in 3 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 482 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter 
Weidemaier & Gulati, Sovereign Debt] (describing the ways contracts are relevant to 
sovereign debt, including in offering creditors enhanced enforcement rights and making 
promises that, if disappointed, would cause reputational harm); Weidemaier & Gulati, The 
Relevance of Law, supra note 2. 
 17. See infra Section III.A. 
 18. See infra Section III.B. 
 19. See infra Section III.C. 
 20. Law and economics scholarship often sharply distinguishes formal from informal 
enforcement and legal from nonlegal enforcement. See, e.g., Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, 
Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 596 (2007) (“When a contract 
uses formal enforcement, breach . . . gives the harmed party the right to appeal to an impartial 
third party to obtain monetary damages from the breaching party. . . . Contract law is 
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Part I of this Article explains the legal framework for enforcing 
sovereign debt obligations, which presents an unusual separation 
of courts’ adjudicatory and enforcement functions. Part II explains 
how reputation operates in the sovereign debt market, analyzing 
how the determinants of effective reputational governance apply in 
this context. Part III discusses what courts add to reputation in this 
market and presents evidence that they serve as reputational 
intermediaries. The evidence includes court decisions and litigation 
documents, generalist and trade media reports, and interviews 
with industry participants.21 Part IV concludes with implications 
for the theory of sovereign debt, informal contract governance, and 
the role of courts in commercial disputes. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS 
Most foreign-issued sovereign bonds contain New York forum 
selection clauses. This Part describes the legal framework for such 
bonds.22 Judgments against sovereign defaulters are hard to enforce 
because sovereign assets are protected by immunities and because 
 
concerned with the question of determining whether or not a breach has occurred and, if so, 
what damages should be given in light of the contract that the parties have signed. In 
contrast, under informal enforcement the harmed party unilaterally decides that breach has 
occurred and then carries out actions that harm the reputation of the breaching party.”). 
MacLeod’s synthesis of the literature highlights the unilateral element of informal 
enforcement: even where collective action is required to punish cheaters, a party that 
considers itself to have been harmed has the power unilaterally to invoke collective 
punishment. Other scholars assume the unilateral element in informal enforcement. See 
DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 36–
60 (1990); Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and 
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994). 
“Formal” is often used interchangeably with “legal” and sometimes also with “public.” 
Likewise, scholars often toggle between “informal,” “nonlegal,” and “private.” See ROBERT 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 127 (1991) (defining 
“law” as rules enforced by governments rather than through social means); Barak D. 
Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2330 (2004). 
Other scholarship is more precise. See BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE 12–13 
(2017); Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Law Without the State, 1 J. L. & CTS. 3 (2013). 
 21. Twenty interviews were conducted by telephone between May and September 2017 
with professionals with substantial experience in the aspects of sovereign debt discussed 
here. Further description of the interviews is in the Appendix. Records of the interviews are 
on file with the author. 
 22. London and U.K. law are the second most common choices of forum and law for 
foreign-issued sovereign debt. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF 
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 54 (2012). The 
aspects of the law relevant to this analysis are substantially the same. 
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sovereigns do not keep assets where they are vulnerable to seizure. 
Sovereigns have two types of immunity from the power of foreign 
courts: jurisdictional and executional immunity. Jurisdictional 
immunity has largely been eliminated for sovereigns when they act 
in a commercial capacity, such as when they issue bonds.23 
Immunity from execution against sovereign assets, however, 
remains largely in place. Bonds that submit disputes to New York 
courts typically waive both jurisdictional and executional immu-
nity with respect to courts in New York. 
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) permits courts to attach sovereign assets that are located in 
the United States, commercial in nature, and connected to the 
dispute under adjudication.24 Assets of a public nature are immune. 
In a dispute concerning a sovereign bond, and in many disputes 
concerning bank borrowing by foreign states, there will typically 
be no assets located in the United States that are connected to the 
dispute. If the contract waives immunity from execution, however, 
a New York court can reach all of the sovereign’s commercial assets 
that are in the United States.25 
For most sovereigns, even this broader formulation leaves few 
to no vulnerable assets in the United States.26 Therefore, some 
 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012) (providing that states benefit from no immunity from 
jurisdiction if either (a) they have waived their immunity or (b) the action is based on a 
commercial activity conducted in or directly affecting the United States); Republic of Arg. v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). Outside the United States, the dominant view is that 
sovereigns do not enjoy jurisdictional immunity for their commercial activities. See HAZEL 
FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITIES 222 (2d ed. 2008). For an overview of the history of 
sovereign immunity law as it relates to sovereign debt, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. 
Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. 
REV. 213, 219; Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law, supra note 2, at 398. For recent 
developments, see Lorenza Mola, Sovereign Immunity, Insolvent States and Private Bondholders: 
Recent National and International Case Law, 11 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 525, 534, 
536 (2012). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012). 
 25. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
67, 92. 
 26. An exception is where the sovereign is making payments on other bonds through 
a fiscal agent located in New York. In that case, creditors might be able to attach payments 
to other bondholders when they are in possession of the fiscal agent. It is possible to use a 
trust structure to avoid this outcome. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I 
(July 12, 2017). Additionally, courts have, in some cases, declined applications to order 
injunctive relief that would interfere with the issuance of new debt or restructuring of 
existing debt, so this enforcement mechanism is not guaranteed. The Republic of Congo, for 
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bonds also submit to jurisdiction and waive immunity before all 
other courts in the world, but only for actions to enforce a New 
York court judgment concerning the bond. Such provisions permit 
investors to pursue sovereign assets, wherever in the world they 
may be. Thus, they appear on their face to offer creditors a strong 
enforcement mechanism. Without global submission to jurisdiction 
and waiver of executional immunity, only rarely can a court outside 
New York enforce a New York court judgment. But even with such 
a waiver, foreign courts exercise only limited coercive power 
because waivers are construed narrowly, either by judicial interpre-
tation or because of statutory limits on their scope. Additionally, 
sovereigns avoid holding vulnerable assets in jurisdictions where 
they might be seized.27 
Because of all these constraints, sovereign bond judgment 
creditors have had very little success enforcing judgments, even 
under the broadest of waivers. Sovereign bonds have therefore long 
exhibited the odd feature of offering creditors access to 
adjudication but not meaningful formal enforcement.28 Early 
modern bonds contained the starkest iteration of this apparent 
paradox: from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s, nearly all bonds 
contained waivers of jurisdictional immunity but hardly any 
waived executional immunity.29 From the mid-1990s until the early 
2000s, many bonds contained broad waivers of jurisdictional and 
enforcement immunity that, as described above, appeared on their 
 
instance, was able to issue new debt in London while it had an outstanding judgment there. 
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017); see also Rossini v. Republic 
of Arg., 453 F. App’x 22, 22–25 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s denial of requests for 
preliminary injunctions enjoining Argentina from issuing bonds); Capital Ventures Int’l v. 
Republic of Arg., 443 F.3d 214, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing trial court’s denial of request 
for an injunction on the grounds that the injunction would have interfered with a bond 
exchange offer). 
 27. Countries that export commodities are the most vulnerable to asset seizure. 
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017). Venezuela scrupulously paid 
its external debt in the face of dire economic conditions because it feared seizure of its oil 
assets. Id. 
 28. A concerted effort by states in the second half of the twentieth century sought to 
formalize governance of sovereign borrowing and led to the inclusion in bond contracts of 
submission to formal enforcement. However, legislatures and courts proved reticent about 
taking coercive actions against foreign sovereigns. Therefore, sovereign bond contracts for 
several decades contained dispute resolution provisions that allowed creditors to get into 
court to litigate on the merits but offered them little prospect of recovery. 
 29. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 25, at 87. 
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face to permit creditors to pursue enforcement in multiple 
jurisdictions. There has been a rollback of submission to courts for 
enforcement purposes in recent bonds: some states have eliminated 
the worldwide immunity waiver from their bonds, limiting 
creditors to New York courts.30 
Bondholders recently achieved one major, but fleeting, enforce-
ment success. Courts in Brussels and New York read a term—
known as the pari passu provision—in Argentine sovereign bonds 
to require Argentina to pay holdout creditors whenever it paid 
creditors that had accepted Argentina’s offer to restructure its 
debt.31 That interpretation permitted a New York court to enjoin 
Argentina from paying restructured creditors unless it also paid 
holdouts. The injunction forced Argentina back into default. 
However, this “ratable payments” interpretation is unlikely to hold 
sway for long. The Second Circuit decision stated emphatically that 
the interpretation was “an exceptional one with little apparent 
bearing on transactions that can be expected in the future.”32 
Moreover, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have rejected 
the interpretation;33 the official sector has lobbied vigorously 
against the interpretation;34 only a minority of outstanding bonds 
 
 30. Compare Republic of Argentina, Prospectus, Registration No. 333-216627, at xi–xii 
(Mar. 14, 2017), with the text of the bonds at issue in the litigation concerning Argentina’s 
2001 default. The immunity waiver from the earlier bonds is quoted in published opinions 
from the litigation. See, e.g., NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Arg. [2011] UKSC 31, [58]–[60] 
(on appeal from [2010] EWCA (Civ) 41). 
 31. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in 
Commercial Boilerplate 16–40 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-40, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2835681. A Belgian court had issued a similar ruling against Peru in 1999. See 
Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Brussel, Sept. 26, 2000, AR No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.). 
 32. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013). The 
court continued, 
Our decision here does not control the interpretation of all pari passu clauses or the 
obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu clauses in other debt 
instruments. As we explicitly stated in our last opinion, we have not held that a 
sovereign debtor breaches its pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and 
not another, or even every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a credi-
tor’s rights. 
Id. 
 33. See FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND 
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 70–71 (2006). 
 34. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 31, at 17. 
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contain the language on which the interpretation was based;35 and 
recent bonds have been drafted to defang pari passu provisions.36 
The difficulty of enforcing judgments would not have been a 
surprise to bond purchasers. Sophisticated banks and invest-
ment firms, which have largely dominated this market, factor the 
legal framework into their risk models.37 Prospectuses of bonds 
issued in New York include disclosures about the bonds’ limit-
ed enforceability.38 
Successfully suing a sovereign debtor, therefore, offers little 
prospect of recovery through conventional means. This is 
especially true of pre-1990 bonds and recent bonds that submit only 
to the courts of New York. Even if the sovereign has substantial 
commercial assets in the United States, it can remove vulnerable 
assets from U.S. territory in anticipation of default or litigation, 
structure its holding of commercial assets so that they are not 
considered sovereign assets, and structure new debt issuances to 
make it impossible for judgment creditors to attach their proceeds.39 
 
 35. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 22. 
 36. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 31, at 30 (finding that as of the second quarter 
of 2016, bonds comprising nearly seventy percent of dollar value of offerings during that 
quarter had revised the pari passu language to avoid the ratable payments interpretation). 
 37. Institutional investors model the legal terms of bonds when calculating their 
riskiness. Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017). Legal terms are present in the 
bonds of risky but not those of riskless sovereigns, and the terms change in response to 
political risk shocks. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of 
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 131 (2012). Sovereign 
immunity and dispute resolution provisions, in particular, vary across issuers and over time 
for individual issuers and, unlike the pari passu provisions, display differences and changes 
that clearly alter the parties’ legal rights. Compare, for example, Argentina’s bonds from the 
1990s to its more recent bonds. See also id.; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2009); Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law, supra note 2, at 397–400. 
See generally Weidemaier & Gulati, Sovereign Debt, supra note 16. 
 38. See, e.g., Offering Circular, The Republic of Ecuador, U.S. $1,000,000,000, 10.750% 
Notes Due 2022, at 25–26 (July 28, 2016); United Mexican States, Pre-effective Amendment 
No. 3 to Registration Statement Under Schedule B of the Securities Act of 1933, Registration 
No. 333-167916, at S-9 (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368 
/000119312510203668/dsba.htm#toc. 
 39. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 
628 (1983) (establishing a “presumption that a foreign government’s determination that its 
instrumentality is to be accorded separate legal status” will be respected); Walters v. Indus. 
& Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 298 (2d Cir. 2011) (establishing a 
presumption that assets of a state-owned company cannot be used to satisfy a judgment 
against the state). But see Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2003) 
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To be sure, avoiding holding assets in or routing them through 
the United States is not costless. A creditor facing an outstanding 
judgment in New York might not be able to issue securities on the 
New York Stock Exchange because proceeds might be subject to 
enforcement, though New York courts have declined to grant 
creditor requests that would prevent new debt issuance.40 Trans-
actions must be structured so as to avoid placing commercial 
property owned by the sovereign within the United States.41 
However, the experience of the creditors that held out against 
Argentina demonstrates the low prospects of achieving satisfaction 
of a judgment against a sovereign debtor in the United States. U.S. 
law is strongly protective of foreign sovereign assets.42 Unlike the 
laws of many European countries, the FSIA irrevocably shields 
assets of a public nature. Under the FSIA, even a broad immunity 
waiver only applies to commercial assets.43 
A sovereign that submits to enforcement in all jurisdictions 
faces higher litigation-related costs. In addition to legal expenses to 
avoid creditors, it might have to remove assets from many 
jurisdictions that offer commercial and investment opportunities. It 
might also face higher costs of engaging in international 
transactions and collecting taxes from entities located abroad. 
However, attachment of sovereign assets by bond creditors is 
vanishingly rare. Creditors can use court orders to throw sand in 
the gears of a defaulting country’s trade and finance. But 
 
(holding that a directly state-owned enterprise can be held to be the state’s alter-ego where 
failing to do so would allow “fraud or injustice”). 
 40. See Rossini v. Republic of Arg., 453 F. App’x 22, 22–25 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming trial 
court’s denial of requests for preliminary injunctions enjoining Argentina from issuing 
bonds); Capital Ventures Int’l v. Republic of Arg., 443 F.3d 214, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(discussing trial court’s denial of request for an injunction on the grounds that the injunction 
would have interfered with a bond exchange offer). 
 41. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 6, at 158–59. A specialized legal practice has arisen 
to advise sovereigns and third parties contracting with them on how to structure transactions 
to avoid having payments subject to enforcement litigation. See Kenneth Reisenfeld, Mark 
Cymrot & Joshua Robbins, Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: Mixed Bag for Energy Cos., LAW360 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/881735/suits-against-foreign-sovereigns 
-mixed-bag-for-energy-cos. 
 42. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation 
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1078, 1086 (2004) (cataloguing the failures of 
judgment creditors’ attempts to collect against sovereign bond defaulters in the United States). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012). 
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experience shows that courts are loath to do so and are often 
circumvented when they do.44 Scholars who have written about 
litigation emphasize these costs.45 However, in practice, even when 
bondholders are empowered to pursue enforcement worldwide, 
they rarely succeed in attaching sovereign assets.46 This observed 
fact demonstrates the weakness of the threat of attachment. 
Sometimes the debt is so small that early settlement is preferable to 
the expense of extended litigation.47 However, on other occasions, 
the amounts at stake are orders of magnitude greater than either 
the legal costs that can be imposed on a debtor through litigation or 
the stock of assets vulnerable to seizure.48 Conventional remedies 
and litigation-related costs therefore are not powerful enough to 
entirely explain why creditors sue and why investors lend. A key 
role of courts in this domain is as information intermediaries that 
strengthen reputational enforcement. 
 
 44. See supra notes 26–27. A bill introduced in Congress in 2011 that sought to bar 
foreign states facing sizeable U.S. court judgments from issuing new debt on U.S. markets 
was unsuccessful. Creditors have in some cases interfered with new debt issuances. See supra 
notes 31–32 and accompanying text. Sovereigns whose economies rest heavily on inter-
national trade in commodities are the most vulnerable but can elude creditors by trading 
through separate corporate entities or concealing their ownership of assets through straw 
companies. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017); Interview with 
Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017). 
 45. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 56–57. 
 46. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default, 
5 ANN. REV. ECON. 247, 262 (2013). In the more than ten years of litigation against Argentina 
before the pari passu ruling and related injunction, its holdout creditors pursued it in courts 
around the world with very little success in attaching assets. 
 47. Media reports indicate that the litigating creditors recovered less than $200 million 
through formal enforcement, under four percent of the $4.6 billion for which these creditors 
ultimately settled with Argentina. See Hilary Burke, Funds to Seize Argentina Assets Held in 
U.S., REUTERS (July 20, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-debt-funds/funds 
-to-seize-argentine-assets-held-in-u-s-idUSL2E8IK8U920120720; Caught Napping, ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 13, 2012), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/10/13/caught-napping; 
Michael D. Goldhaber, An Infamous Bet, AM. LAW. 48, 50 (Oct. 2016), http://www.american 
lawyer-digital.com/americanlawyer-ipauth/201610flaip?pg=48#pg48; Julie Wernau & Taos 
Turner, Argentina Debt Deal Poised to Deliver Big Payday to Holdouts, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 29, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-holdout-creditors-agree-to-4-65-billion-settle 
ment-1456760652. 
 48. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 194; Interview with Senior Sovereign 
Debt Lawyer II (July 19, 2017) (discussing a case he worked on in which the debtor state had 
almost no assets outside its territory but was concerned about litigation). 
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II. REPUTATION IN THE SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET 
The extent to which a market relies on informal versus formal 
enforcement depends on the relative costs of each for incentivizing 
optimal compliance with contracts. The effectiveness of reputation 
and the mechanism by which it operates depend largely on two 
dimensions of information costs: the cost of producing credible and 
relevant information about traders, and the cost of transmitting that 
information to prospective counterparties. Information costs, to-
gether with the value of lost future transactions, determine the cost 
of cheating. 
The sovereign debt market exhibits some features that make it 
amenable to reputational governance and others that hinder 
reputation from operating effectively. The reputation-supporting 
features are substantial. Sovereign borrowers are about as far from 
anonymous as a commercial entity can be and are subject to 
significant scrutiny by the press and other information-reporting 
institutions. These characteristics lower the costs of disseminating 
information about default behavior, not only to bond market 
participants but also to actors in other fields in which sovereigns 
operate. In addition, sovereigns have a long time horizon49 and few 
alternative opportunities that are shielded from the effects of 
reputation in the sovereign debt market. These factors increase the 
cost of compromising future transactions by incurring reputational 
damage. Against the characteristics tending toward effective repu-
tational enforcement, high monitoring and verification costs pose 
the greatest barrier to effective reputational governance. 
A. Information Dissemination Costs 
Reputation’s effectiveness increases as information about past 
behavior spreads more widely among potential counterparties.50 
 
 49. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time horizons 
of sovereigns and the time horizons of governments. 
 50. This is a key lesson from the literature on informal governance. Much of the value 
of closed and quasi-closed networks is the inability to escape one’s past. See Lisa Bernstein, 
Contract Governance in Small World Networks: The Case of the Maghribi Traders, NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Bernstein, The Case of the Maghribi Traders]; Bernstein, Opting 
Out, supra note 11; Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the 
Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981). 
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Contemporary sovereign debt defaults are highly visible events. 
They are front-page news, not only in industry trade publications 
but also in mainstream newspapers. Today, most sovereign debt 
takes the form of bonds. Unlike in the past, when most sovereign 
debt consisted of syndicated loans from a small number of highly 
sophisticated banks, modern bonds are often held by dispersed 
creditors or by institutions that manage the assets of masses of 
investors, which draws public attention to default events. 
Defaults often occur during times of economic crisis, when 
scrutiny of the defaulting sovereign is high. Credit rating agencies 
and the IMF report on sovereign borrowers’ behavior during 
restructuring negotiations,51 and both regulation and custom 
dictate that sovereigns include information about previous 
defaults in their prospectuses.52 
Sovereign defaults thus result in the widespread dissemination 
of information about the facts of a default, the time spent in default, 
levels of creditor recovery, and treatment of creditors during 
default and restructuring. 
B. The Value of Lost Future Transactions 
The threat of a tarnished reputation is only as strong as the 
value of the future transactions it jeopardizes. The value of lost 
future trade depends, to a large extent, on how widely word 
spreads about bad behavior, and as discussed above,53 sovereign 
defaults are no secret. Further, sovereigns face an effectively 
infinite time horizon and costly reputation spillovers beyond the 
 
 51. See, e.g., IMF, Dominica: Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criterion, Country 
Report No. 04/286, at 11–12 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter IMF, Country Report No. 04/286] (“The 
authorities have followed best practices in implementing the debt restructuring exercise (i.e., 
transparency, creditor consultations, and inter-creditor equity). They approached creditors 
at an early stage, while continuing to service fully their obligations under the program . . . .”); 
cf. Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing, 4 
ECON. & POL. 117 (1992). 
 52. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina, Prospectus (Mar. 14, 2017), supra note 30. SEC rules 
require the disclosure of this information for debt issuances to retail investors, but even 
prospectuses for issues to Qualified Institutional Buyers, which are exempt from those 
disclosures, often include them. 
 53. See supra Section II.A. 
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bond market. Together, these factors tend to raise the stakes of 
incurring reputational damage. 
Most theories of sovereign borrower reputation assume perfect 
information and a unitary state with an infinite time horizon.54 
While sovereigns have an effectively infinite time horizon, 
governments do not. Governments of democracies that default on 
debt might be punished politically because of the economic damage 
resulting from default.55 Some governments, therefore, have 
incentives to behave like actors with long time horizons. On 
occasion, however, governments that default are rewarded 
politically.56 Theories of sovereign borrower reputation with more 
realistic assumptions and stronger predictive power account for a 
non-unitary state, changing government, learning by investors, and 
different reputational consequences resulting from opportunistic as 
compared to non-opportunistic default.  
Michael Tomz’s reputational theory of the sovereign debt 
market accounts for investors’ limited information and their ability 
to learn about sovereigns’ political preferences by observing 
political change and behavior. Tomz offers strong empirical 
support for this theory.57 He shows that investors consider not only 
whether a sovereign has defaulted but also why it has defaulted. 
Recognizing that creditors care about the reasons for default is key 
to understanding the role of courts in sovereign debt disputes.  
Creditors have incomplete information and the capacity to 
learn about governments’ changeable preferences. Reputations 
consist of types, and Tomz identifies creditors’ classifications of 
 
 54. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 10–13. Tomz describes standard reputational theories 
that assume that borrowers have complete information about sovereign lenders’ preferences 
and that those preferences are static. Such assumptions necessarily rest on the assumptions 
that the sovereign is a unitary entity with a single set of preferences rather than a complex 
organization with leadership that changes over time. 
 55. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text; Kenneth A. Schultz & Barry R. 
Weingast, The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International 
Competition, 57 INT’L ORG., Winter 2003, at 3, 5, 13–14. 
 56. Rafael Correa campaigned for Ecuador’s presidency on a debt repudiation 
platform, won, defaulted, and was reelected despite the economic harm the default caused 
to the country. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt 
Contracts: The Case of Ecuador, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (2010). Similarly, Argentina’s 
Kirchner government used its stance against so-called vulture creditors as a key component 
of its populist appeal for over ten years. 
 57. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 9–14. 
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sovereign borrowers as lemons that always default, fair-weathers that 
default when times are bad, or stalwarts that always repay.58 
Investors learn about types by observing countries’ decisions 
whether to repay in light of prevailing economic circumstances.59 
They update their beliefs in response to new information.60 Grossman 
and Van Huyck similarly model investors as “differentiat[ing] 
excusable defaults, which are associated with implicitly understood 
contingencies, from unjustifiable repudiation.”61  
Under Tomz’s theory, a country’s reputation changes when it 
acts contrary to its perceived type, which usually reflects political 
change.62 Investors’ beliefs about states’ preferences regarding 
repayment affect their willingness to lend and the yield they 
demand.63 Past behavior affects future investment decisions 
because of what it reveals about likely future behavior.  
The sovereign bond market is unlike the archetypal reputation-
governed market described in the literature on informal 
contracting.64 It is not a small, close-knit community, or even a 
closed network. Its size and openness would seem to make 
coordinating collective retaliation more costly and undermine 
efforts to ostracize cheaters. Neither Tomz’s nor Grossman and Van 
Huyck’s models involve investor retaliation or collusion. 
Governments know how investors view reputation and decide 
whether to default or repay based on the costs of each.65 Empirical 
studies have found evidence suggesting that sovereign bond 
investors do not retaliate against past defaulters.66 Instead, the 
evidence points to defaulters paying a risk premium, but not 
 
 58. Id. at 17, 23. One-third of sovereign defaults occur during good times. Michael 
Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 352, 
355 (2007). 
 59. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 17. 
 60. Id. at 18. 
 61. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: 
Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1088, 1097 (1988). 
 62. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
 63. Id. at 23–25. 
 64. See supra notes 11–14, 20, 50 and accompanying text. See also JANET TAI LANDA, 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF CHINESE MERCHANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: IDENTITY, ETHNIC 
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT (2016); Bernstein, The Case of the Maghribi Traders, supra note 50.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 65. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 25–27; Grossman & Van Huyck, supra note 61 at 1090–95. 
 66. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
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punitive, excess returns.67 While default has been found to block 
market access for a period, there is no indication that the barriers 
to access involve collective action rather than resulting from 
uncoordinated market forces. That is, when defaulters lose 
market access, it is because investors are unwilling to offer credit 
at a rate acceptable to the sovereign because of the latter’s 
extreme riskiness.68  
Ostracism is not necessary to effectively sanction a breacher as 
long as credible reputational information is widely available to 
market participants and future transactions are more valuable than 
the gain from cheating now. Prominent examples of reputational 
governance described in the informal contracting literature that 
seem to hinge on ostracism look different on closer examination. 
Avner Greif, for instance, describes the Maghribi traders as 
ostracizing suspected norm violators.69 However, even without 
ostracism, a trader’s bad reputation, if spread widely enough, 
would impose costs by reducing his pool of counterparties and 
permitting them to demand a risk premium. The key to the 
Maghribis’ effective reputational enforcement is that it was 
common knowledge that news of bad behavior would be widely 
disseminated. Bernstein shows in a new study of the Maghribis that 
a great deal of the value of their network lay in the provision of 
information and the ability to verify it by triangulation using 
several sources.70 Her findings suggest that ostracism played a 
smaller role in governance than has been assumed. Instead, letters 
were filled with detailed information about events at various trade 
nodes, including verifiable facts at a granular level, such as market 
prices on certain dates and when ships arrived and departed from 
port. What closed-network governance offers of most significance 
is not the prospect of collective shunning but the inescapability of 
past behavior. The lower the proportion of prospective counter-
parties a cheater expects will learn of his behavior, the less likely he 
 
 67. Tomz & Wright, supra note 58. 
 68. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 196–219. 
 69. Greif, supra note 50. Some historians have argued that the evidence does not 
support the claim that the Maghribis practiced ostracism. Jeremy Edwards & 
Sheilagh Ogilvie, Contract Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders 
Reappraised, 65 ECON. HIST. REV. 421, 441–42 (2012). 
 70. See Bernstein, The Case of the Maghribi Traders, supra note 50. 
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is to expect sanctions, and the more likely he is to cheat. The 
technologies that disseminate knowledge of sovereign debtors’ 
behavior assure all parties in the sovereign debt market that 
nonpayment and information about the reasons for nonpayment 
will be publicized.71 
Spillover effects in other social fields raise the cost of cheating. 
For the governments that make decisions about whether to repay 
creditors, spillover effects threaten three key fields beyond the 
sovereign debt market: foreign direct investment and international 
trade, international relations, and domestic politics. Various 
aspects of reputation operate with differing force, and sometimes 
push in different directions, in each of these fields. Earning a 
reputation for opportunism or promise breaking through a dispute 
with foreign bondholders hurts reputation most in the bond market 
and foreign direct investment, but it might worsen or improve a 
government’s reputation in the short run in domestic politics and 
with some other states. Defaulting on foreign-issued debt 
discourages foreign direct investment—which dollar-for-dollar is 
more beneficial to a country than debt—because foreigners worry 
about having their assets seized or being otherwise devalued by 
state action.72 Defaulting might hurt the country’s international 
trade by making short-term trade credit unavailable because of 
heightened political risk.73 
A defaulting state faces the prospect of sanctions in its relations 
with other sovereigns and multilateral financial institutions. Unlike 
in the private sector, reputational governance in the official sector 
is partly driven by concerted action. States have faced, for instance, 
threats of loan and aid denials from the multilateral development 
and lending institutions, as well as suspension of trade benefits, for 
 
 71. See id. 
 72. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 31, 58 (describing how defaulting reduces 
foreign direct investment); Interview with Senior Sovereign Transaction Lawyer (Aug. 14, 
2017) (“A lot of investment, particularly infrastructure investment, requires lending. You 
have to get lenders to lend to the country. Lenders are generally uncomfortable lending into 
a defaulted sovereign, one that has a reputation for interfering or not honoring loans. 
Default . . . [also often] prevents payments by private sector borrowers because [it] affects 
foreign exchange. . . . [Y]ou’re reluctant to finance to or in that country.”). 
 73. Interview with Senior Sovereign Transaction Lawyer (Aug. 14, 2017). 
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refusing to pay arbitration awards.74 Opportunism in relations with 
foreign creditors tends to harm reputation with states that value the 
rule of law and with the multilateral financial institutions, such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank, whose decision-making is powerfully influenced, if not 
controlled, by those states.  
However, other factors tend against public-sector sanctioning 
of sovereign debtors that default. Aggressive creditors also face 
reputational risk with the same public-sector actors listed above 
because public-sector actors value global financial stability, poverty 
alleviation, and their reputations for promoting those goals. 
International public-sector actors sometimes judge the legal rights 
of particular creditors to be at odds with these other values. 
Moreover, non-Western states now control a large proportion of 
global capital and might offer alternative potential funding sources. 
Those states’ willingness, in order to advance political goals, to 
provide funds in spite of a country’s poor reputation for repayment 
eases reputational pressure on states that, in the past, would have 
faced ostracism in international public-sector lending.75 
Further, a sovereign that earns a reputation for promise 
breaking and law defiance risks incurring a fundamental repu-
tation problem across social fields that is more difficult to 
ameliorate than a reputation for economic mismanagement. 
Whereas the latter can be offset, to some extent, by committing to 
implement different policies, the former undermines a sovereign’s, 
and a government’s, very power to promise. A reputation for 
promise breaking can hardly be mitigated through additional 
promises.76 Therefore, sovereigns should be protective of their 
reputation for keeping promises. 
Finally, given the heterogeneity of preferences of actors in the 
three social fields described above, creditors can strengthen the 
reputational threat to recalcitrant governments by uncovering or 
 
 74. See Charles N. Brower, Sadie Blanchard & Charles B. Rosenberg, International 
Development Loans and Non-compliance with Investment Arbitration Awards, in A REVOLUTION 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR. 529 (Borzu 
Sabahi et al. eds., 2014). 
 75. Interview with Senior Sovereign Transaction Lawyer (Aug. 14, 2017). 
 76. See Weidemaier & Gulati, Sovereign Debt, supra note 16, at 486–87; Rachel Brewster, 
Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231 (2009). 
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highlighting behavior by the government that is viewed negatively 
by third parties with power to sanction the state, even if that 
behavior is not part of the core dispute.77 This ability of creditors to 
leverage information tangential to the central legal dispute, but 
central to the concerns of other potential transactors with the 
sovereign, expands the scope of reputational enforcement to cover 
cases in which agents of the state would not be punished, and might 
even be rewarded, for violating debt obligations. 
C. Monitoring and Verification Costs 
However effectively reputation channels broadcast information 
that threatens to jeopardize breachers’ future transactions, informa-
tion dissemination cannot support trade if the information is not 
sufficiently trusted or if signals are excessively noisy. Hurdles to 
trust in information regarding sovereign bond defaults include 
high monitoring and verification costs and heterogeneous prefer-
ences among market participants. 
The kind of information that is relevant to sovereign reputation 
depends on what the relevant audiences care about. As explained 
above,78 creditors consider not only whether a sovereign has 
defaulted but also why it has defaulted. They distinguish defaults 
they deem justifiable from unjustifiable debt repudiation.79 
Investors therefore care about aspects of default about which the 
truth is not easily ascertained, such as whether the default was 
opportunistic or necessary. They also care about whether default 
was caused by external shocks or economic mismanagement80 and 
about how the state treats creditors in the event of default. As a 
senior sovereign debt lawyer explained, 
 
 77. Cf. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 7–9 (discussing the related concept of “issue linkage”). 
 78. See supra notes 55–68 and accompanying text. 
 79. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 17, 23; Grossman & Van Huyck, supra note 61. One-third 
of sovereign defaults occur during good times. Tomz & Wright, supra note 58, at 355. 
 80. See ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT 57–99 (2014) (describing 
investors’ willingness to lend to even recently defaulting states when they judge the default 
to have been justified). Interviewees also explained that market participants care about the 
reason for a default and how it was handled. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I 
(July 12, 2017); Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017). Reinhart and Rogoff argue 
that “willingness to pay rather than ability to pay is typically the main determinant of 
country default.” REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 54. 
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 What the market remembers more than the fact of a debt 
restructuring is the professionalism with which it’s done. If you 
do it like Argentina, where the politicians are able to make a huge 
political, populist point about fighting the vultures and so forth, 
the market remembers that. Uruguay restructured in 2003; did it 
very maturely. The market rewarded it, and Uruguay was able to 
do a wholly voluntary issuance.81 
Much of the sovereign’s decision-making that affects its ability 
to repay, its decision whether to repay, and how to restructure 
cannot be perfectly monitored because of high exogenous risk and 
the complexity of the economic, financial, and political factors that 
affect ability to pay.82 Creditors cannot perfectly monitor the value 
of the resources available for payment, so it is difficult to discern 
whether a restructuring offer is a good deal or a bad one. 
Some interview subjects remarked that the market has a short 
memory. They therefore questioned how strong of a threat 
reputation poses.83 Statistical evidence, however, shows that 
sovereigns that are expected to default pay more on average for 
capital, that sovereigns that default in defiance of market 
expectations faced increased borrowing costs, and that sovereigns 
that establish a record of diligent repayment reduce their 
borrowing costs.84 Further, reputation during default should be 
considered separately from reputation at the time of future debt 
offerings. Even if the market were quick to forgive a defaulter once 
it has settled with creditors, a belief by holdout creditors that the 
state is dealing unfairly and understating its ability to pay 
lengthens the time in default. This, in turn, increases the harm to 
the country from defaulting. As long as a sovereign remains in 
 
 81. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017). 
 82. Cf. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, Reputation Effects and the Limits of 
Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry, 115 Q.J. ECON. 989 (2000) (finding that 
Indian software firms develop a reputation for remediation, which they can control, rather 
than quality alone because quality is poorly correlated with performance); MacLeod, supra 
note 20 (showing that warranty contracts lower the cost of informal enforcement as 
compared to standard sales contracts because of imperfect correlation between performance 
and quality). 
 83. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017). 
 84. TOMZ, supra note 3. 
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default,85 its credit ratings remain low, further sovereign borrowing 
is expensive or impossible, and nongovernmental sectors are 
negatively affected.86 Even if investors’ memories are short once 
a default is cured, reputation can deter cheating when informa-
tion is disseminated widely if present reputation, by preventing 
a state from curing default, causes sufficient harm during the 
period of default. 
The rest of this Part describes the information provided about 
sovereign borrowers by two key information intermediaries oper-
ating in the sovereign debt market: multilateral official lending 
institutions and credit rating agencies. It also explains why 
investors view those institutions as having limited reliability as 
reputation verifiers. 
1. Multilateral official lending institutions 
Public-sector multilateral lending institutions, such as the IMF 
and the Inter-American Development Bank, monitor and report on 
the behavior of sovereigns, including sovereign borrowers.87 The 
information they provide probes deeply into the core issues of 
willingness versus ability to pay, the competence of economic 
management, and the impact on a debtor country of exogenous 
shocks. The IMF monitors and disseminates information relevant 
to sovereign behavior under two ongoing monitoring programs 
and engages in more intensive monitoring of countries that borrow 
from the IMF. The first program, Article IV bilateral surveillance, is 
continuous monitoring of and annual reporting on all member 
countries, which assesses economic and financial policies that affect 
the country’s stability, including exchange rate; monetary, fiscal, 
and financial sector; and structural policies.88 Bilateral surveillance 
also includes assessments of “inward spillovers,” or global 
 
 85. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 40 (Int’l Monetary Fund 
Working Paper WP/12/203, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012 
/wp12203.pdf. 
 86. Id. at 40, 62. 
 87. See Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus 
Corporate Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 990–97 (2007). 
 88. See IMF, Guidance Note for Surveillance Under Article IV Consultation 8–9 (May 2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/031915.pdf. 
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economic factors that affect financial stability.89 The second 
program is the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Program. 
Member countries that voluntarily subscribe to this program 
commit to providing economic and financial data to the IMF for 
public dissemination on a regular basis.90 If a member stops 
sending data or if the IMF is concerned about the information’s 
veracity, the member becomes subject to escalating censures. Early 
censures are not made public, but the IMF eventually announces a 
country’s continued refusal to cooperate.91 
In addition to bilateral surveillance, the IMF intensively 
monitors and reports on countries under IMF reform and 
adjustment programs. Countries that borrow under certain IMF 
instruments must agree to intensive monitoring and reporting. 
Low-income countries may also choose to be intensively monitored 
and reported on without borrowing.92 A stated purpose of the 
IMF’s discretionary monitoring programs is to enable countries to 
signal commitment to stabilizing economic policies.93 Some 
sovereign debt contracts have required the borrower to remain a 
member in good standing of the IMF,94 and in some cases countries 
have borrowed small amounts from the IMF specifically to show 
prospective creditors that they were willingly subjecting them-
selves to heightened IMF monitoring.95 
 
 89. Id. at 9. 
 90. See IMF Standards for Data Dissemination, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/45/Standards-for 
-Data-Dissemination. 
 91. Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017). 
 92. The IMF’s Policy Support instrument (PSI) and Staff-Monitored Programs allow 
intensive monitoring without borrowing. See Policy Support Instrument (PSI), INT’L MONE-
TARY FUND (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02 
/21/21/Policy-Support-Instrument; Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017). 
 93. See Policy Support Instrument (PSI), supra note 92. Staff-Monitored Programs are 
informal agreements between the country and the IMF to monitor execution of a predeter-
mined economic reform program. See IMF Management Completes the Second Review Under the 
Staff-Monitored Program for Somalia and IMF Managing Director Approves a New Staff-Monitored 
Program, INT’L MONETARY FUND n.1 (July 12, 2017), https://imf-fmi.africa-newsroom.com 
/press/imf-management-completes-the-second-review-under-the-staffmonitored-program-for 
-somalia-and-imf-managing-director-approves-a-new-staffmonitored-program?lang=en; In-
terview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017). 
 94. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 87, at 998. 
 95. Id. at 999. 
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When countries subject to intensive monitoring have defaulted, 
or are known to be at risk of default, the IMF’s published reports 
might assess the sovereign’s economic management, its resources 
available to pay creditors, and whether restructuring negotiations 
are following conventional best practices. Such IMF reports 
provide reasoned opinions about the causes of default or 
threatened default and details about the timing and terms of any 
restructuring offers and creditors’ responses.96 While publication of 
surveillance reports of a member country is subject to its consent, 
there is a presumption of publication under all monitoring programs 
except bilateral surveillance. Under bilateral surveillance, the IMF 
publishes a press release upon completion of each report. There-
fore, under all of the IMF’s monitoring programs, non-publication 
sends a negative signal.97 IMF monitoring will thus provide at least 
some information relevant to assessing the causes of default and 
ability and willingness to pay. 
However, market participants and observers have questioned 
for some time the IMF’s capacity to serve as a delegated market 
monitor.98 Moreover, creditors have reasons to anticipate that their 
perspectives on a debtor state’s future behavior might differ from 
the views of the multilateral institutions, or that the multilateral 
institutions might, themselves, have reputational weaknesses that 
 
 96. See, e.g., IMF, Country Report No. 04/286, supra note 51. 
The authorities have followed best practices in implementing the debt 
restructuring exercise (i.e., transparency, creditor consultations, and inter-creditor 
equity). They approached creditors at an early stage, while continuing to service 
fully their obligations under the program . . . . 
  . . . . 
The debt restructuring process is lagging behind. The authorities announced 
a debt exchange offer on April 6, which includes a menu of three bonds, with long 
maturities, low interest rates and (two of them) at a discount. There has been 
partial creditor participation in the debt exchange offer and its deadline was 
extended twice. The larger domestic creditors (the National Bank of Dominica and 
the Social Security) and one of the two large bond issues have agreed in principle 
to participate. Discussions with the other private external creditors are continuing. 
Discussions with bilateral creditors are at an advanced stage, some of them have 
expressed a preference for waiting until the private debt deal is completed. The 
Caribbean Development Bank has agreed “in principle” to a debt restructuring 
proposal consistent with inter-creditor equity. 
Id. at 5, 11 (emphasis omitted). 
 97. Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017). 
 98. See Gulati & Triantis, supra note 87, at 996–97. 
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limit their ability to credibly influence third parties. As explained 
by one market participant who has worked exclusively on 
emerging market sovereign debt since its origin in the 1990s, 
private-sector creditors have limited trust in the IMF. They see the 
IMF and private-sector creditors as having fundamentally 
conflicting interests when both are lenders to the same country,99 
and they see themselves as being in contest with public-sector 
lenders and at an informational disadvantage relative to them: 
 It’s not a level playing field. The debt sustainability analysis 
does not make public all of the assumptions the IMF has, so the 
private sector is playing a guessing game to figure things out. The 
IMF has more information than the private sector, but they’re not 
giving it out. The private sector says, give us all the tools you’re 
using and let us do our own analysis, so we can be on the same 
level playing field as you. There is a tension when the 
determination is made about whether the country is holding all it 
can or is not doing all it can . . . . It’s not a search for the truth if 
one party is holding more of the cards.100 
One example of a disagreement between the IMF’s assessment of 
ability to pay and that of creditors is the Iraq debt restructuring 
during the early 2000s. Some creditors believed that the IMF’s debt 
sustainability analysis underestimated Iraq’s expected oil income.101 
Moreover, the IMF and other multilateral financial institutions 
are political institutions. They have multiple objectives that are not 
always aligned with the interests of particular creditors or 
creditors’ rights in principle. They are often portrayed as having 
political stakes in particular outcomes.102 The positions the 
 
 99. See Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 671–72. 
 100. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017). 
 101. Joanna Chung & Stephen Fidler, Why Iraqi Debt Is No Longer a Write-Off, FIN. TIMES 
(July 16, 2006), https://www.ft.com/content/b94bccb4-14e7-11db-b391-0000779e2340. Cred-
itors in that case were restrained from litigating because of the heavy involvement of the 
official sector in support of Iraq. 
 102. See, e.g., Larry Elliott, IMF’s Own Watchdog Criticises Its Handling of Eurozone Crisis, 
GUARDIAN (July 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/28/imf 
-watchdog-criticises-handling-eurozone-crisis; Martin Sandbu, Beware Greeks Bearing Rifts: 
Why Varoufakis Couldn’t Fix the Debt Crisis, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2018), https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-12-12/beware-greeks-bearing-rifts; 
Heather Stewart, IMF Will Refuse to Join Greek Bailout Until Debt Relief Demands Are Met, 
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/30/imf-will 
-refuse-join-greek-bailout-until-debt-relief-demands-met. 
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multilateral institutions take in sovereign debt disputes are not 
based on transparent, predefined, universal, objective criteria, and 
are not always justified by publicly reasoned decisions. 
Ecuador’s default in 2008 illustrates the various reasons for 
creditors’ limited trust of multilateral lending institutions. 
Ecuador’s President Correa staged an “audit” of the country’s 
foreign-issued debt, which concluded that the country’s foreign 
debt was illegitimate and illegal on grounds ranging from legally 
incorrect and logically unsound to plausible.103 The report 
scathingly criticized both Ecuador’s private-sector and public-
sector creditors, and concluded that loans from both involved 
irregularities.104 Nonetheless, when Ecuador selectively and 
opportunistically defaulted on several of its bonds in 2008, it 
announced that it would not default on the $4.3 billion it owed to 
the multilateral lending institutions.105 Ecuador admittedly had no 
fiscal need to default, and its coercive restructuring flouted 
practices of transparency and good-faith negotiating promoted by 
the multilateral lending institutions. Yet, to creditors’ conster-
nation, no multilateral institution criticized Ecuador’s imposition 
on creditors of a sixty-five percent haircut.106 Officials of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) backed Ecuador.107 Reuters 
reported that analysts said the Bank’s backing “could strengthen 
Ecuador’s position against bondholders by giving some legitimacy 
to the default and signaling that the tiny country holds the upper 
hand in negotiations . . . .”108 One market analyst likened the 
 
 103. The audit was conducted by political appointees and not conducted with the 
counsel or participation of professional auditors according to accounting standards. See 
Porzecanski, supra note 56, at 270. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Coroner’s Inquest, 28 INT’L FIN. L. REV., 
Sept. 2009, at 22; Most Holders of “Illegal” Debt Settle with Ecuador, LATINLAWYER ONLINE (June 
12, 2009), https://files.skadden.com/sites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fpublications%2FPublica 
tions1891_0.pdf. 
 106. See Felix Salmon, Lessons from Ecuador’s Bond Default, REUTERS: FELIX SALMON 
(May 29, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/29/lessons-from-ecuadors 
-bond-default/ (describing creditors’ frustrations with the default and the multilateral 
lending institutions’ stance on it); Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 105, at 22. 
 107. See Porzecanski, supra note 56, at 268. 
 108. Alexandria Valencia & Alonso Soto, Regional Lenders Back Ecuador in Debt Talks, 
REUTERS (May 18, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-caf-loans-idUSTRE 
54H58220090518. 
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IADB’s support to “saying that Ecuador has a very strong hand 
against bondholders in a poker game,” which “could prompt more 
investors to participate (in the buyback) to avoid being on the 
losing side.”109 An IMF official stated, “We understand that 
Ecuador’s decision to default on these bonds is based on a dispute 
about [their] legal validity rather than [on] debt sustainability 
[grounds], and of course we don’t take sides on the merits.”110 
The stance taken by the multilateral institutions on Ecuador’s 
default was not decided through a transparent process based on 
rules known in advance. To the contrary, the support of Ecuador 
was inconsistent with customary market norms previously 
affirmed by the institutions about acceptable reasons for defaulting 
and how restructuring should be carried out. Moreover, the 
multilateral lending institutions had an apparent conflict of interest 
between their dual roles as lenders and market monitors. Ecuador 
levied many of the same allegations of legal violations and 
illegitimacy against their loans as it did against its private-sector 
debt but offered to stand down from repudiating public-sector debt 
and to force private-sector creditors to take the fall. It is not difficult 
to see, therefore, why market participants lack confidence in the 
multilateral institutions as reputation intermediaries. 
2. Credit rating agencies 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) provide standardized reputa-
tional signals, combining various dimensions of sovereign 
borrower risk—including economic, political, and institutional 
factors111—into a single credit rating. Ratings are forward-looking 
assessments of creditworthiness, measured either as the risk of 
default or the expected loss through default.112 For sovereigns, 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Transcript of Regular Press Briefing by Caroline Atkinson, Director, External Relations 
Department, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr 
/2008/tr121808.htm, quoted in Porzecanski, supra note 56, at 269. 
 111. See Standard & Poor’s Ratings Servs., How We Rate Sovereigns (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/How+We+Rate+Sovereigns.pdf 
/a9419c9e-eb76-4283-83a6-34d0e8b13112. 
 112. S&P’s ratings only seek to capture the risk of default occurring, whereas Moody’s 
tries to capture expected loss, a broader measure, and Fitch employs a hybrid that focuses 
only on default probability until default occurs, at which time it distinguishes based on 
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unlike corporations, they include an assessment of the risk of 
opportunistic default.113 Rating agencies maintain ratings contin-
uously, reassess them periodically, and affirm or change them upon 
the occurrence of significant events that might impact credit-
worthiness. Agencies publish not only the alphanumeric rating 
category but also reasons for changing a rating or reports about 
particular issuers.114 
Default is reflected in ratings in two ways. S&P’s approach is 
illustrative. First, a sovereign’s rating is immediately adjusted to D 
(Default) or SD (Selective Default) and remains in that category as 
long as it is in default.115 Agencies make their own determination 
of whether an action by the government is a default and do not rely 
on legal definitions of default.116 Default might include 
nonpayment or delayed payment of principal or interest, or any 
contract modification that reduces the value of bonds in a manner 
 
expected recovery rates after default occurs. Ashok Vir Bhatia, Sovereign Credit Ratings 
Methodology: An Evaluation 4–5 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/02/170, 2002). 
 113. See NORBERT GAILLARD, A CENTURY OF SOVEREIGN RATINGS 13 (2012); S&P Glob. 
Ratings, General Criteria: Principles of Credit Ratings 6 (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.standard 
andpoors.com/en_US/delegate/getPDF;jsessionid=9B0556F3C518FE65F2041644D9DED00
7?articleId=2017767&type=COMMENTS&subType=REGULATORY. 
 114. See, e.g., Fitch Upgrades Argentina’s Foreign Currency IDR to ‘B’; Outlook Stable, BUS. 
WIRE (May 10, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2016051000 
6412/en/Fitch-Upgrades-Argentinas-Foreign-Currency-IDR-Outlook; Press Release, Moody’s 
Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody’s Upgrades Argentina’s Issuer Rating to B3 with a 
Stable Outlook (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades 
-Argentinas-issuer-rating-to-B3-with-a-stable—PR_347279; Press Release, S&P Glob. Mkt. 
Intelligence, S&P Affirms Argentina Ratings (Apr. 15, 2016) (affirming a B- debt rating). 
 115. See, e.g., S&P Glob. Ratings, Research Update: Ukraine Foreign Currency Ratings 
Lowered To ‘SD’ (Selective Default) on Distressed Debt Restructuring (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://www.standardandpoors.com//en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/20014208 
(reporting change to Ukraine’s rating prompted by its seeking to restructure its debt; rating 
adjustment announced three days after the government’s announcement). Moody’s does not 
use a “default” category but considers “Track Record of Default” as a factor that is used to 
adjust the score for “Institutional Strength,” one of four factors that go to a sovereign’s credit 
rating. See GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 26–27; Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., Rating Methodology: 
Sovereign Bond Ratings 3 (Dec. 22, 2016). 
 116. See Bhatia, supra note 112, at 9; S&P Glob. Ratings, Research Update: Ukraine, supra 
note 115 (determining that Ukraine’s invitation to bondholders to buy back debt is a 
“distressed debt restructuring”). See generally S&P Glob. Ratings, General Criteria: Rating 
Implications of Exchange Offers and Similar Restructurings, Update (May 12, 2009), 
https://www.taiwanratings.com/portal/front/showCustomArticle/2c9c31d755d00f86015
6253779ee0074 (defining the criteria for determining when an exchange offering constitutes 
a distressed debt restructuring). 
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the agency deems to be “coercive, involuntary, and distressed.”117 
Even a voluntary bond exchange might be classified as a default if 
the agency determines that creditors restructured because they 
expected that nonparticipation would leave them worse off.118 
Once a sovereign has cured a default, its rating is adjusted to 
reflect the agency’s assessment of the state’s default risk at that 
time. The past default is taken into account because of its impact on 
other economic circumstances that go into the rating, as well as in 
the consideration of the country’s “debt payment culture.” Debt 
repayment culture is a “potential adjustment factor” that can 
reduce the sovereign’s scaled score in the Institutional Assessment, 
one of the five assessments that go into the rating. A sovereign 
determined to have a weak debt payment culture always receives 
an Institutional Assessment score of six, the lowest possible score. 
The Institutional Assessment score in turn caps the sovereign’s 
rating at BB+, which is speculative grade.119 
Sovereign ratings by CRAs are decided by the ratings 
committee, in which a group of analysts pore over economic data 
and debate qualitative factors to process scores on input criteria, 
and other considerations, into ratings.120 After debate, a nominated 
subset of the group votes on scores for various categories and, 
ultimately, on the final ranking.121 
The ability of CRAs to offer investors assurance that they will 
serve as effective reputation intermediaries is compromised by the 
CRAs’ own reputation problems and the information risk that they 
face. Sovereign ratings have been criticized as political,122 
incompetent,123 and conflicted,124 not least because sovereigns pay 
 
 117. See GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 13; Bhatia, supra note 112, at 9. 
 118. Bhatia, supra note 112, at 10. 
 119. S&P Glob. Ratings, Sovereign Rating Methodology 41–42 (Dec. 23, 2014). 
 120. Bhatia, supra note 112, at 10. 
 121. Id. at 12, 26. 
 122. Paul Krugman, The Plot Against France, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2013), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/11/11/opinion/krugman-the-plot-against-france.html; Frank Partnoy, 
The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 662 (1999). 
 123. Bathurst Reg’l Council v Local Gov’t Fin Servs Pty Ltd [No. 5] (2012) FCA 1200, ¶53 
(Federal Court) (Austl.). 
 124. BARTHOLOMEW PAUDYN, CREDIT RATINGS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CREDITWORTHINESS THROUGH RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (2014); Bhatia, supra 
note 112, at 32–50. 
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to be rated.125 Frank Partnoy has thoroughly described the limited 
informational value and reputational deficiencies of credit ratings.126 
While the divergence between market opinion and credit raters’ 
opinions became more apparent during the Euro crisis, the gap 
between credit ratings and what investors care about was not new.127 
Rating agencies are also subject to information risks. Sovereigns 
have information-sharing agreements with CRAs, from whom they 
solicit ratings that require the sovereign to grant access to relevant 
information and personnel.128 CRAs collect most of their data 
directly from sovereigns. While they try to triangulate with other 
sources, the quality of their ratings is heavily influenced by the 
quality of the country’s data and the extent of its cooperation.129 A 
sovereign in trouble can hide relevant information in ways that are 
difficult for an agency to detect.130 A study of sovereign ratings 
concluded that “[t]he first and most basic problem confronting the 
ratings agencies is information risk”; “[s]overeign ratings analysts 
have limited ability to corroborate official data”; “ratings [are] often 
assigned or maintained in the absence of full information” because 
 
 125. Elaine Moore, Do Sovereign Credit Ratings Still Matter? FIN. TIMES (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/fa563ac4-492e-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab; Jeannette Neumann, 
SEC Charges Egan-Jones, Says Firm Exaggerated Its Expertise, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 24, 2012, 
7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303592404577364132973207216.  
 126. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
1407 (2017); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, 
in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert 
E. Litan eds., 2006); Partnoy, supra note 122. 
 127. The head of Fitch’s sovereign ratings acknowledged, “What we look at and what 
investors look at is not always the same thing.” Moore, supra note 125. When the modern 
emerging market bond market began to develop, ratings of emerging market sovereigns 
were untested and rating agencies already had credibility deficits from their ratings of other 
types of debt. Bhatia, supra note 112, at 42 (using statistical analysis of defaults and ratings 
to find consistent upside bias), 43–45 (discussing information risk, analytical constraints, and 
revenue bias). An early failure in sovereign ratings occurred during the 1997–98 Asian crisis, 
when emerging market ratings and the emerging market bond market were relatively new. 
Id. at 6; Emerging Mkt. Traders Ass’n, History and Development, EMTA, http://www.emta 
.org/template.aspx?id=34 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
 128. Rating agencies have access to government information and officials when ratings 
are solicited. Their analysts meet with officials from the “treasury or finance ministry, central 
bank, and other ministries responsible for areas of key economic importance . . . , politicians 
within and outside government.” They also speak with official and private-sector observers 
within and outside the country. S&P Glob. Rankings, Sovereign Rating Methodology, supra note 
119, at 41–42. 
 129. Bhatia, supra note 112, at 43. 
 130. Id. at 42. 
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of limited cooperation by governments; and “data shortcomings or 
willful concealment generally” are biased to the benefit of the 
sovereign.131 CRAs also have limited analytic capacity because of 
resource constraints.132 This leads to a conservatism that reduces 
the accuracy of ratings since a substantial part of what CRAs do is 
aggregate opinions from the creditor and debtor sides of the market 
through a rather opaque process.133 
Finally, investors’ reliance on credit ratings varies depending 
on their investment strategies. While some passive investors rely 
heavily on credit ratings, other investors conduct their own, more 
sophisticated analyses to improve the forecasts of credit rating 
agencies.134 Nondiscretionary holdings by financial institutions 
compose a large proportion of sovereign bond holdings. Such 
bonds are held as part of mandates that prescribe features of the 
combination of equities that investment managers’ portfolios must 
contain. For example, a fund manager might be mandated to mimic 
the performance of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate 
Index. She will then hold sovereign bonds as dictated by a passive 
sampling method that buys and sells securities to match those in 
the index. A percentage of the fund will comprise, for example, 
emerging market sovereign bonds of a certain rating. Alternatively, 
a manager might have a mandate to hold a certain share of bonds 
with a particular credit rating, or bonds that are investment grade. 
Under these investing approaches, some of which are regulation 
driven, a drop in a sovereign’s credit rating below a certain level 
will automatically prompt a sale.135 Discretionary investment, in 
contrast, tries to beat the market and relies less on credit ratings. 
Some discretionary investors attend more carefully to the legal 
 
 131. Id. at 43–44. 
 132. Id. at 45. 
 133. See id.; see also GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 14 (describing how S&P’s actual criteria 
differ from its published criteria: S&P states that its ratings reflect only default probability, 
but its ratings might also reflect expected severity of default). 
 134. Interview subjects confirmed this to be the case in sovereign debt investment. 
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Economist (July 6, 2017); Interview with Distressed 
Debt Researcher and Advisor (Mar. 2, 2014). Other scholars have found the same to be true 
of investors in other fixed income markets. See Jane Tripp Howe, Credit Analysis for Corporate 
Bonds, in BOND CREDIT ANALYSIS: FRAMEWORK AND CASE STUDIES 43 (Frank J. Fabozzi 
ed., 2001). 
 135. Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017). 
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terms in bonds; distressed debt investors scrutinize the legal terms 
closely.136 But notice also that the ability of a drop in a sovereign’s 
credit rating to automatically trigger bond sales and to exclude its 
debt from many large portfolios increases the reputational leverage 
a holdout creditor can have by lengthening the time in default or 
showing a creditor to be unwilling, rather than unable, to pay. 
III. WHY COURTS? 
As discussed above, scholars usually think of formal legal 
enforcement through courts as an alternative to informal 
enforcement. In the literature discussing opting out of the legal 
system, parties eschew courts because courts do not cost-effectively 
provide incentives that reduce the risk of contract failure to an 
acceptable level, given the value of trade at stake. In those cases, 
courts have one or more of several weaknesses. They are corrupt or 
incompetent; they apply rules, interpretive methods, or remedies 
unsuited to the trade; or resorting to litigation undermines an 
ongoing commercial relationship that the parties wish to sustain. 
Traders therefore develop alternatives to expand the domain of 
value-creating exchange.137 Why, in the sovereign bond context, do 
courts emerge as the lowest-cost provider of certain types of 
important information? Why do actors in this market, which by 
most accounts runs on informal enforcement, resort to courts? 
The sovereign debt market’s reliance on courts together with 
other sources of reputation information is, to some extent, a “belt 
and braces” approach to reputation verification. The previous Part 
outlined the weaknesses of other sources of information. Just as 
sovereigns solicit ratings from multiple credit rating agencies and 
investors triangulate among multiple agencies’ ratings, it is not 
 
 136. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Litigators (July 29, 2017); Interview with 
Senior Sovereign Debt Economist (July 6, 2017); Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 
2017). 
 137. Bernstein’s diamond merchants, for instance, resorted to informal governance in 
part because courts could not offer remedies that would reliably and adequately compensate 
merchants for contract breaches. Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 11. Similarly, the legal 
system would not support the relations of Greif’s Maghribi traders because the promises 
they exchanged were not of an enforceable type, because courts could not verify their actions, 
and because courts could not reach traders in distant locales or their assets to exercise 
enforcement authority. See Greif, supra note 50. 
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surprising that, in a high-stakes market governed largely by repu-
tation, actors choose to also make courts available as an alternative 
adjudicator of reputation.138 
But courts also provide information that other providers cannot 
or will not provide. Through litigation, holdout creditors can reveal 
information that other reputation-shaping institutions do not 
provide and that matters to investors and other third parties with 
sanctioning power. One distressed debt investor who has sued a 
defaulting sovereign put it thus: “We’re the only ones who have the 
financial means, motivation and sophistication to unravel 
incredibly sophisticated schemes.”139 A baseline requirement for 
courts to function in this capacity is that the value at stake in 
sovereign debt disputes warrants resort to litigation. Unlike many 
other markets in which contractual obligations are enforced 
primarily by reputation, monitoring costs and sums at stake in the 
sovereign debt market are often sufficiently high to justify recourse 
to costly litigation. 
If this condition is satisfied, courts can perform three distinctive 
information functions in sovereign debt disputes. First, unlike other 
reputational institutions, they can make legal determinations that 
coordinate and uphold market participants’ expectations. Second, 
courts have unique information-forcing and processing powers. 
Third, creditors use litigation to reframe the political and moral 
aspects of sovereign debt disputes. 
A. Legal Determinations Matter 
Actors in the sovereign debt market accept the decisions of the 
courts that decide sovereign debt disputes as authoritative on 
whether certain behavior at the local level—that is, between 
particular parties—constitutes breach.140 By choosing New York 
law and submitting in its bond indenture to litigation in New York, 
a sovereign commits to having its treatment of individual 
 
 138. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International 
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 931–36 (discussing the 
literature on how states create international tribunals to enhance the reputational impact of 
violations of international law). 
 139. Aram Roston, Vulture Capitalism, PLAYBOY, Dec. 2010, at 60, 185 (quoting a 
distressed debt investor).  
 140. Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 20, at 10. 
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creditors judged against its contractual obligations and a body of 
law that instantiates commercial norms widely accepted by the 
market in a public forum trusted by creditors. New York law and 
courts take a formalistic, predictable approach to adjudicating 
business disputes. These features of judicial decision-making 
contrast sharply with the decision-making processes of the other 
information intermediaries operating in this market, described 
above.141 First, courts attend to the complaints of individual 
creditors. Since courts uniquely apply legal rules and legal reasoning 
through a legal process, they assure transacting parties of some 
measure of stability of norms and their application. By doing so, 
they support planning and investment. This function of courts is 
fundamentally different from the reputational function served by 
CRAs and multilateral financial institutions. 
This function of law and courts in sovereign debt disputes is a 
paradigmatic example of a legal order without centralized 
enforcement as theorized by Hadfield and Weingast. Parties to 
sovereign debt contracts choose New York or UK law as the rules 
that govern their contractual relationships. As Hadfield and 
Weingast explain, those rules assign behavior to the classification of 
“breaching” or “nonbreaching.” Parties choose the courts of those 
jurisdictions to authoritatively apply the chosen classification 
rules.142 Hadfield and Weingast find an equilibrium in a repeated 
game in which a third-party institution providing such a “common 
logic” sustains collective enforcement. Their equilibrium requires the 
coordinating institution to operate according to classic attributes of 
law, including “generality,” “stability,” “qualified universality,” 
“clarity, noncontradiction,” and “impersonal, neutral, and indepen-
dent reasoning.”143 These are defining features of courts. 
 
 141. See supra Section II.D. 
 142. See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 20, at 7–8. 
 143. Id. at 3–9. I depart from Hadfield and Weingast’s requirement of punishment. 
Their model involves what is known as “altruistic punishment” because parties that respond 
to negative reputational signals by declining to transact do not do so out of immediate self-
interest. As explained above, I build on Tomz’s theory of the sovereign debt market, which 
rests not on altruistic punishment but on self-interested responses to heightened risk. See 
supra notes 57–68 and associated text. Hadfield and Weingast’s model nonetheless applies 
because they separate the adjudicator’s information-production role from its remedial role 
and show that the former can support a legal order. 
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Completely private ordering requires a shared understanding 
of what behaviors constitute violations of norms that warrant 
sending negative reputation signals to the market.144 The complex-
ity of sovereign debt contracting renders it impossible for private 
coordination to categorize all relevant behaviors. Adjudication 
therefore substitutes for this aspect of private order. As explained 
above, other things being equal, investors consider a sovereign that 
treats creditors poorly during default worse than one that 
restructures in a way that creditors perceive as fair.145 Default 
activates a number of other contract terms such as collective action 
clauses and other provisions envisaged to enable restructuring. A 
sovereign is subject to additional reputational penalties for failing 
to renegotiate and conduct its default in accordance with the terms 
of the bond and in good faith. 
In hard cases—those in which the behavior of the parties is 
difficult to categorize under their respective legal rights and 
obligations—courts determine the content of sovereign promises 
and verify adherence to, or breach of, those promises rather than 
leaving those determinations to a contest of allegations. They 
therefore protect not only creditor expectations but also sovereign 
expectations and reputation against opportunistic creditors. In that 
sense, courts attend to reputation on a micro level, examining the 
bilateral relationship. They judge treatment of particular creditors 
and empower those creditors to demand that the state’s treatment 
of them be publicly judged against legal rules that embody market 
expectations for contractual counterparties. CRAs and the IMF, by 
contrast, focus on sovereign behavior at a macro level. 
 
 144. See MacLeod, supra note 20. One way that parties address situations in which 
contractual performance is poorly correlated with outcomes is through warranties. Under a 
warranty, the performing party can prevent the dissatisfied counterparty from sending a 
negative reputation signal to the market by paying compensation or remediating the 
unsatisfactory outcome. See id. However, warranties such as those that promise to remedy 
product defects are unsuitable to bonds because a bond failure—a default—will affect a high 
proportion of bonds at once and ipso facto involves a (real or claimed) inability to pay 
amounts owed. This latter feature necessarily implies an inability to make a warranty 
payment sufficient to make creditors whole. See JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF 
CORPORATE REPUTATION 17–20 (2013). In close-knit communities, other sources of norm 
coordination exist, such as shared religion or ethnicity. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 
11; Greif, supra note 50; Landa, supra note 50. 
 145. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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The obligation to repay under sovereign debt contracts is 
usually sufficiently simple that a minimally informed observer can 
see that a default has occurred. Sovereign debt contracts require 
repayment of specified sums on specified dates. Credit rating 
agencies and trade associations declare default within days of 
nonpayment. Courts routinely decide on summary judgment that 
default has occurred. When other legal issues presented require a 
full hearing, the analysis of whether default occurred is 
straightforward and brief.146 However, other rights and obligations 
of the parties to sovereign bond contracts are complex. The contract 
might contain collective action clauses, exit consents, amendment 
clauses, acceleration clauses, cross-default clauses, or aggregation 
clauses that require interpretation and application to facts to 
determine whether a promisor has run afoul of its obligations. The 
governing law supplies additional rights and obligations. The 
rights and obligations specified in the contract and the governing 
law can powerfully impact restructuring negotiations. Courts have 
the capacity and credibility to resolve disputes concerning these 
terms in ways that market participants will accept. Even without 
formal enforcement, the courts’ pronouncements establish authori-
tative decisions on parties’ competing claims.147 
Elliott Associates v. Peru offers an illuminating example of this 
function of courts and a related hypothetical.148 Peru argued that 
Elliott was not a valid assignee for various reasons, including that 
its purchase of debt on the secondary market violated New York’s 
champerty law.149 It was not obvious how New York’s champerty 
law, which was a century old, applied to the new investment 
 
 146. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(“Failure to tender payment pursuant to a contract is a material breach. Therefore, where a 
contract unambiguously requires the defendant to make payments pursuant to its terms, and 
the defendant fails to make said payments, judgment must issue in favor of the plaintiff. 
These principles are routinely applied in favor of creditors suing foreign states on defaulted 
loan agreements.” (citations omitted)). 
 147. See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 20. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt 
Lawyer VI (Aug. 22, 2017) (“The mere fact of a judgment or arbitral award has force, there is no 
doubt about that. . . . The judgment then resolves the issue that there’s no dispute to be had 
whether the money’s due. The judgment or award has a legal consequence or moral effect.”). 
 148. Elliott Assocs., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (reversed by Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 
194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 149. Id. at 344. 
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strategy of distressed sovereign debt investors. The practice was 
controversial, even among investors, because distressed debt 
investors frustrated other creditors’ efforts to restructure their debt 
holdings by buying debt on the verge of restructuring and refusing 
to participate.150 The district court discussed the commercial policy 
implications of barring the practices of the distressed debt investors 
by applying champerty law:  
 Elliott’s position is strong as a matter of policy in the world of 
commerce. Peru borrowed billions of dollars from commercial 
banks in exchange for the obligation to repay the principal with 
interest. Peru spent the borrowed funds, and now refuses to repay 
an assignee of the debt. Failure to enforce a bargain between 
sophisticated parties such as Peru and their lenders would, 
according to Elliott, undermine reasonable expectations about 
contract law, the terra firma upon which contemporary business 
transactions are based. Moreover, restrictions on the rights of 
commercial lenders to assign the debt were not negotiated for by 
Peru, and imposing some restriction here seems at odds with the 
strong policy in favor of the free alienability of property. Cast in 
this light, § 489[, the champerty statute,] seems to fit 
uncomfortably with current sensibilities—a relic of Medieval 
English legal concerns about the perversion of judicial process 
given effect by the common law doctrine of champerty.151 
After concluding the discussion with the counterpoint, “Yet, the 
Court’s role here is not to make policy assessments[,]”152 the court 
held that the creditor’s actions violated the state’s champerty law. 
The Second Circuit overturned the ruling, determining that the 
creditor’s conduct did not constitute champerty.153 It supported its 
holding with both legal and commercial policy reasoning. The 
commercial policy analysis was that applying champerty law to 
disallow assignment of distressed debt would render restructurings 
effectively involuntary and force creditors to “participate in an 
involuntary ‘cram-down’ procedure.”154 
Had the Second Circuit upheld Peru’s victory on the issue in the 
district court, and if Elliott were the only remaining holdout, Peru 
 
 150. See id. at 335–36. 
 151. Id. at 345. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 154. Id. at 380. 
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would have had no legal obligation to pay Elliott, and Elliott would 
have lost any power to prevent Peru from curing its default in the 
eyes of the market. That outcome would have reduced Peru’s time 
in default and therefore the harm to its reputation. Future bond 
purchasers might have demanded a higher yield from emerging 
market sovereign bonds given the reduced liquidity revealed or 
created by the court’s decision, but there would be no reason for 
them to see Peru as posing any special risk because it had 
successfully asserted its legal rights. 
B. Gathering and Processing Facts 
Creditors use courts to reveal two types of factual information 
relevant to sovereign debtor reputation. The first type is relevant to 
reputation for promise keeping and law adherence. To apply the 
relevant rules to the instant case, a court must, of course, ascertain 
the relevant facts. During a contentious dispute, courts have the 
institutional capacity to obtain and process factual information 
necessary to determine the parties’ legal rights and obligations. In 
addition, courts play a second informational role in this market. 
They allow creditors to obtain information that is not directly 
relevant to whether breach occurred, but that goes to the state’s 
ability to pay. This information is relevant, for different reasons, to 
third parties who have power to punish the government officials 
responsible for the decision not to pay the creditors. 
1. Facts that determine legal rights and obligations 
Courts ascertain facts about the behavior of debtors and 
creditors during default and restructuring processes. The adjudi-
cated facts in turn determine the parties’ legal rights and 
obligations, which, as explained above, matter to investors and 
other potential transactors with the sovereign.155 For example, in 
the litigation between Elliott Management and Panama arising out 
of that state’s restructuring of syndicated bank loans, an issue of 
law was whether Panama even owed any contractual obligation to 
Elliott. Panama argued that the assignments of the debt to Elliott 
were invalid because more than half of the lenders had activated 
 
 155. See supra Section III.A. 
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the original contract’s amendment clause, thus barring assignment 
of the debt. Whether the assignments were valid hinged on a 
disputed factual issue: the date on which the assignments were 
made. In finding that the assignments were made before the 
deadline imposed by the restructuring agreement, the court 
assessed no fewer than eight independent sources of evidence in 
the record and highlighted undisputed facts that supported the 
court’s conclusion as to the dates.156 
Two aspects of the court’s institutional capacity permitted it to 
adjudicate the disputed facts: it was empowered to collect evidence 
through sworn testimony and document production and to 
authoritatively determine the truth of the matter. Absent the 
judicial power to compel the production of evidence and take 
testimony under oath, each party could hide evidence as to 
disputed facts and indefinitely maintain the truthfulness of its 
position, leading to a reputational impasse. Absent a credible third-
party adjudicator to render a decision on these disputed issues of 
fact, reputation for promise keeping and law adherence could not 
be authenticated.157 The state and the lenders that wanted to 
restructure could have colluded against the unpopular holdout. 
While CRAs and multilateral financial institutions have 
significant access to information about sovereign debtors, courts 
have unique information production capacities. They allow the 
parties to demand the production of information of their choosing. 
Even if a court has little ability to sanction a sovereign for resisting 
judicial information-gathering power, defiance of a court is 
publicized and results in adverse reputational inferences. Stone-
walling a court, or being found to have provided false or 
misleading documents or testimony, poses a greater risk to 
reputation than evading or misleading a CRA. That is not least 
because a CRA has incentives not to report being misled or 
 
 156. Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Pan., 975 F. Supp. 332, 337–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(describing and assessing the evidence offered by both parties, which included sworn 
testimony by an executive of Elliott Associates as to the procedure by which the transaction 
was concluded and the relevant dates, “hand-written trade tickets and confirmatory 
documents,” copies of letters from the original lenders to the courts in related proceedings 
in state court, “Assignment Notices” submitted to Panama by the original lenders and Elliott, 
and sworn testimony by an employee of one of the defendant banks as to the meaning of 
those “Assignment Notices”). 
 157. Cf. Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 923–24 (2018). 
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stonewalled, but also because its process lacks the public 
performance element of judicial process. Additionally, litigating 
creditors can compel information from third parties that courts can 
sanction. The New York or London forum selection clause thus 
operates as a reputation bond posted by creditors and sovereigns 
to back a commitment to honesty and forthrightness during the 
restructuring process. 
2. Facts relevant to other dimensions of reputation 
As discussed above, one way that creditors can increase 
reputational harm to sovereign debtors is by revealing information 
on multiple dimensions of reputation.158 Third parties who have the 
power to sanction public officials might do so for reasons apart 
from the officials’ decisions to breach duties owed to creditors. 
Creditors have pursued this strategy by using sovereign debt 
litigation to reveal corrupt activities by debtor state governments. 
They argue that the state is able to pay but that the government is 
unwilling to pay because political leaders are diverting public 
funds to themselves. Corruption revelations might hurt a country’s 
bond market position with sovereign bond investors, who look at 
both economic fundamentals and political risk.159 The market 
considers sovereigns that default opportunistically to be higher 
risk, all else equal.160 Credit rating agencies’ institutional assess-
ments consider corruption.161 But corruption is more reliably 
harmful to reputation across social fields than is reputation for 
treatment of creditors. Whereas the domestic population might 
reward the government for reneging on foreign-issued debt, it is 
unlikely to view the misappropriation of public funds favorably. 
Similarly, while foreign countries and multilateral institutions that 
have relationships with the debtor and that provide aid, loans, and 
other economic benefits might side with a sovereign regarding 
 
 158. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 159. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Economist (July 6, 2017) (identifying 
corruption as a key issue in the political assessment that goes into sovereign debt investment, 
advising: “[I]t’s all about the economic fundamentals and the politics. We would hire 
political scientists.”). 
 160. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 161. See S&P Glob. Rankings, Sovereign Rating Methodology, supra note 119, at 11–12. 
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payment of creditors, the revelation of corruption makes those 
actors less willing or able—for ethical, political, and reputational 
reasons—to maintain support for the debtor. 
Domestic political constituencies, other states, and public 
multilateral lending institutions take a more reliably negative view 
of corruption than of failing to pay foreign creditors. Lengthy 
sovereign default disputes tend to involve countries with severe, 
systemic corruption.162 Leveraging that fact, creditors have, in 
several cases, pursued a strategy of using discovery to uncover 
corruption, thereby imposing the threat of ongoing reputational 
damage on ruling elites as long as litigation continues. These costs 
can help creditors through two mechanisms. In the first, 
government officials implicated in corruption are pressured to 
settle to prevent further discovery of their corrupt activities. In the 
second, the corruption revelations undermine the sitting govern-
ment and open the door for a new government willing to settle with 
creditors. As two senior sovereign debt lawyers explained, “The 
strategy . . . is . . . to allow the political forces at play within the 
country to know that this is an obligation that needs to be dealt 
with. . . . You hope you might find some assets, but that’s not the 
primary reason [for suing].”163 The lawyers explained that in one 
dispute they got the attention of politicians in powerful Western 
countries and elevated the dispute to an international relations 
issue by using litigation to uncover the corrupt activities of the 
government in power in the debtor state.164 
Two recent cases are illustrative. A holdout against the 
Republic of Congo leveraged discovery of corruption by the 
country’s autocratic president, his family, and other top officials to 
obtain a settlement of its debt claim. Through discovery, for 
example, creditors of the Republic of Congo uncovered shell 
companies used to misappropriate oil assets and showed that the 
president’s son had used funds from those companies for personal 
 
 162. See Roger Parloff, Judge: Vulture Fund Leaked Documents to Human Rights Group, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 21, 2007), http://fortune.com/2007/08/21/judge-vulture-fund-leaked 
-documents-to-human-rights-group/. 
 163. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Litigators (July 29, 2017). 
 164. Id. 
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purchases of luxury goods.165 Creditors disclosed the incriminating 
documents to the anti-corruption organization Global Witness, 
which posted them to its website together with an analysis of the 
corruption they revealed. The creditors also released the docu-
ments to news outlets in several countries.166 The information was 
widely reported and drew attention both within and outside the 
Republic of Congo.167 
The creditors obtained the documents through a Hong Kong 
court. After Global Witness, based in London, published the 
documents on its website, an offshore company owned by Denis 
Sassou-Nguesso, the son of the Congolese president, asked a UK 
court to order that they be taken down.168 The UK court decided in 
Global Witness’s favor, not only in permitting public disclosure of 
the documents but also in publishing a reasoned decision for his 
ruling, which compounded the reputational damage by publicizing 
efforts to hide the information. Sassou-Nguesso had asked the court 
to discharge the case confidentially, which would have prevented 
the publication of the court’s decision and prevented Global 
Witness from speaking about the case. Sassou-Nguesso also asked 
the judge not to refer in his opinion to the litigation in Hong Kong 
because the courts there had kept the proceedings confidential. The 
court rejected all of the claimant’s secrecy requests and disclosed 
them in the opinion, asserting a strong public interest in disclosure 
of the details of the litigation. He explained, 
 If I were not to refer to the order [of the Hong Kong court], 
I would in my view give to the public a misleading account of 
the relevant events and of the matters I have taken into account 
in reaching my conclusion. . . . If I were to refer to that order in 
a separate confidential judgment, I should preclude GW and 
others from referring to it. In the context of this case, . . . there 
is a significant public interest in the subject matter of 
GW’s publications . . . .169 
The information revealed through the litigation catalyzed 
several chain reactions that put pressure on Congolese officials. The 
 
 165. See Long Beach Ltd. v. Glob. Witness Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB), [9]–[15] (Eng.). 
 166. See id. at [40.7]. 
 167. See id. at [42]. 
 168. See id. at [18]. 
 169. Id. at [28]. 
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detailed corruption revelations were a political liability within 
Congo. An anti-corruption activist in the country told the New York 
Times, “If it were not for these vulture funds, we would not know 
any facts about the way our country’s wealth is being taken 
away . . . . We don’t agree with their ultimate aims, but they are the 
only ones capable of exposing the truth.”170 Revelations of 
corruption also prompted political action in donor countries. A 
Member of the UK Parliament sought information from the UK 
Secretary of State for International Development about what 
actions had been taken by the IMF, the European Union, and the 
UK government regarding corruption relating to Congo-
Brazzaville’s oil trade.171 The documents were brought before the 
U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Diane E. Watson, 
who described the corruption revealed by the documents at length, 
highlighted the poverty of the Congolese population, and 
suggested that Congo was in breach of its commitments under a 
multilateral debt relief program. 172  
Donor countries have the power to block aid and lending to 
countries such as Congo. While the creditors were uncovering 
details about the misappropriation of Congolese oil revenues, 
Congo was negotiating for conditional aid from a joint program of 
the IMF and World Bank. The institutions agreed preliminarily to 
provide debt relief but required the country to reduce corruption 
before it would qualify for permanent debt relief. The revelation of 
new corrupt activities threatened the country’s receipt of funds 
from the multilateral financial institutions.173 
The details revealed through the litigation about how officials 
structured oil transactions to misappropriate funds were valuable 
to Global Witness and enabled it to expand its own investigations. 
The organization knew that corruption was occurring in the oil 
 
 170. Lydia Polgreen, Unlikely Ally Against Congo Graft, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/world/africa/10congo.html. 
 171. See Long Beach Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB) at [42]. 
 172. See 110 CONG. REC. E1500 (daily ed. July 11, 2007) (statement of Rep. Diane E. 
Watson) (referring to the Global Witness documents). 
 173. See John Cassidy, The Next Crusade, NEW YORKER (Apr. 9, 2007), http://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2007/04/09/the-next-crusade; Robert Friedman, The Vulture Wars, 
CNN MONEY (June 12, 2006, 10:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/09/news/inter 
national/congo_fortune/. 
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sector but lacked details about how it was carried out. The creditors 
were able to marshal the information-gathering resources of the 
courts that were not available to NGOs investigating corruption.174 
The litigation produced information about specifically which 
Congolese officials were involved, how they were spending their 
ill-gotten gains, and which foreign banks and law firms facilitated 
the transactions.175 
Moreover, the litigation uncovered activities that formed the 
basis for separate legal action against not only the state and its 
public officials but also parties with which it transacted. The 
creditors brought a RICO action in the United States against Congo, 
its state-owned oil company, and a French bank, alleging money 
laundering and other unlawful activities.176 Third parties that 
transacted with Congo now risked being implicated in corruption 
and money laundering and becoming embroiled in related legal 
action.177 French prosecutors, under pressure from transparency 
and anti-corruption NGOs, opened investigations into Congolese 
elites who held wealth in France.178 Amid these developments, 
Congo settled with the creditor, reportedly paying $90 million of 
the $100 million in judgments it held.179 
One of Argentina’s creditors pursued a similar strategy when 
prosecutors and investigative reporters in Argentina uncovered 
evidence of corruption by the Kirchners and a business associate of 
theirs, a scandal known in Argentina as “The Route of the 
K[irchner]-Money.”180 The creditor obtained discovery orders in 
 
 174. See Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 148, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 177. See also Interview with Felix Salmon (July 28, 2017). 
 178. See Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017); Shirley Pouget, 
Why a Trial in Paris Marks a Milestone for Anticorruption Activists, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (June 16, 
2017), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/why-trial-paris-marks-milestone 
-anticorruption-activists. 
 179. Roston, supra note 139, at 183. 
 180. See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 2:14–cv–492–RFB–VCF, 2014 WL 
3898021, at *2–4 (D. Nev. 2014); Argentina’s Ex-President Kirchner in Court over Another 
Corruption Case, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.france24.com/en/20180918 
-argentinas-ex-president-kirchner-court-over-another-corruption-case; Santiago Pérez & 
Taos Turner, In Argentina, Mix of Money and Politics Stirs Intrigue Around Kirchner, WALL 
STREET J. (July 28, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-argentina-mix-of-money-and 
-politics-stirs-intrigue-around-kirchner-1406601002 (discussing the corruption scandal). 
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U.S. Federal Court in Nevada relating to straw companies set up by 
the Panamanian law firm Mossack & Fonseca of the infamous 
Panama Papers leaks. Those straw companies allegedly were used 
to embezzle $65 million in public funds through corruptly obtained 
public works contracts.181 President Kirchner had sought to quash 
the investigation in Argentina by firing the prosecutor who 
originally reported his findings of corruption.182 The action in 
Nevada reinforced and exacerbated the corruption allegations and 
threatened to lead to further revelations. The leading Argentinian 
newspapers reported on the U.S. litigation, including the U.S. 
court’s finding that the creditors had proven that public funds had 
been embezzled.183 
In Argentina’s dispute with holdouts, the link between 
information revealed about corruption by the creditors’ litigation 
efforts and the state’s decision to settle is less clear than in the 
Congo case. That is because the pari passu ruling and the related 
injunctions placed such intense pressure on Argentina, and because 
President Kirchner’s party no longer controlled the executive 
branch when the debt was settled. However, the case suggests how 
litigation might credibly threaten to unseat politicians, especially in 
democracies, who are susceptible to corruption allegations and 
unwilling to pay creditors. 
C. Issue Framing by Litigants 
Courts allow litigants to argue publicly over the relevant norms 
and how they apply to the parties’ behavior. The other reputation-
shaping institutions that operate in this market have internal, top-
down agenda-setting processes and lack the public aspect of courts 
that allows them to perform this function. As described above, 
credit ratings seek to produce systematic deductions from a 
 
 181. See NML Capital, 2014 WL 3898021 at *2–5. 
 182. See Prosecutor Campagnoli to Remain Suspended, BUENOS AIRES HERALD (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/148187/prosecutor-campagnoli-to-remain-suspended. 
 183. See Un caso que comienza a afianzar las sospechas [A Case that Begins to Reinforce 
Suspicions], LA NACION (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1777054-un-caso-que 
-comienza-a-afianzar-las-sospechas; Daniel Santoro, Un juez de EE.UU., tras las empresas 
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compilation of various qualitative and quantitative data inputs. To 
produce ratings that allow comparison across the matrix of not only 
sovereign but all debt issuers,184 CRAs follow defined method-
ologies that set out the factors and weights by which they assess 
sovereign creditworthiness. While CRAs, like courts, take in 
information from market participants, they run that information 
through their own rigid framework of relevant factors and weights. 
But CRAs are poorly placed to highlight new or idiosyncratic issues 
or to give the disputing parties a platform in which to do so. 
Similarly, the IMF has a mission much broader than the particular 
concerns of debt holders. 
During litigation, by contrast, although the parties’ arguments 
are somewhat constrained by the applicable legal rules, they have 
space to highlight issues they deem relevant or want to make 
salient, or to press changes to the law. Recourse to courts gives the 
parties a forum in which to shape the norms by which others 
should judge the parties’ behavior. This dynamic of sovereign debt 
litigation accords with Michael Reisman’s theory of international 
law as a process of communication185 and Avner Greif’s theory of 
how economic actors change “the rules of the game” over the long 
run by institutional development that supplies new information or 
changes payoffs.186 Greif names courts and credit bureaus as two 
paradigmatic examples of such institutions.187 In sovereign debt 
litigation, courts vie institutionally with other sources of information 
about sovereign creditworthiness and related behavior.188 
While the IMF deemphasizes corruption and CRAs consider it 
as but one among a host of relevant factors, creditors use the courts 
 
 184. See GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 16. 
 185. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture, International 
Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 105–07 (1981) 
(discussing the theory of international lawmaking as a product of communications among 
groups, which “are, perforce, communications networks” in which participants contend to 
shape norms through various available channels). 
 186. See Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and 
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 915–16 (1994). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Cf. PAUDYN, supra note 124, at 1–2 (discussing a contest between sovereigns and 
credit rating agencies to “constitute what counts as authoritative knowledge in the market”). 
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to place it front and center.189 This allows them to reframe the 
reputational dispute between themselves and the government of 
the sovereign debtor. Sovereigns frame litigation by holdout 
creditors as preying on the population of indebted countries.190 By 
using litigation to uncover corruption, creditors have been able to 
offer a competing frame, arguing that it is not they but the 
government that is preying on the population, impoverishing the 
country by stealing public funds that could be used to re-
pay creditors.191 
In the Congo litigation,192 the court’s analysis raised 
accountability issues, not only for the leaders of Congo but also for 
Western governments and multilateral financial institutions that 
had agreed to provide debt relief to the country. The court spoke 
directly to an issue that was the subject of heated controversy: 
whether development aid should be conditional on good 
government within recipient countries, and if so, to what extent. 
The United Kingdom had recently expressed strong opposition to 
the World Bank’s efforts to withhold aid from countries known to 
have severe corruption problems. The United Kingdom had 
announced it would withhold funds from the Bank in response.193 
The UK court quoted at length from a World Bank document 
 
 189. See Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017) (“The IMF 
would say it’s not their job to [assiduously investigate corruption]. But why are these 
countries getting debt relief when they are having huge revenues coming in that are just 
not properly managed[?]”). 
 190. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer VI (Aug. 22, 2017) (“The country is 
getting poor, and some NY hedge fund is getting very rich.”). 
 191. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyers III and IV (July 29, 2017) (“It’s the 
corrupt regimes that tend not to want to deal fairly with their creditors.”). A journalist who 
has reported extensively on sovereign debt described how a creditor that had obtained 
discovery about corruption by the leaders of the Republic of Congo approached him about 
reporting that information and then was displeased that, in reporting it, the journalist 
highlighted that the creditor’s purpose was to recover money. In the journalist’s telling, the 
creditor wanted the emphasis placed on the government’s bad actions and believed that 
highlighting the creditor’s profit motive undermined the reputational hit of the information. 
See Interview with Felix Salmon (July 28, 2017). 
 192. See discussion supra notes 165–179 and accompanying text. 
 193. Heather Marquette, The World Bank’s Fight Against Corruption, 8 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF., Spring/Summer 2007, at 27, 28; Hilary Benn, Full Text of Hilary Benn’s Speech on 
Corruption, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/feb/03 
/development.internationalaidanddevelopment; Francis Fukuyama, A Battle Paul Wolfowitz 
Can’t Win, AM. INTEREST (Sept. 16, 2006), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2006 
/09/16/a-battle-paul-wolfowitz-cant-win. 
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announcing the approval of debt relief for the Republic of Congo 
and emphasizing that country’s commitment to addressing corrup-
tion in its oil sector so that “resources [would] not be hijacked by 
vested interests.”194 The court concluded that “[t]he profits of 
Coltrade’s oil sales should go to the people of the Congo, not to 
those who rule it or their families.”195 
The litigation exemplifies how creditors can challenge, through 
the courts, the framing of the dispute and even norms of broader 
relevance than the core underlying legal dispute. The official sector, 
and most private-sector creditors, were prepared to forgive most of 
the country’s debt, and the multilateral financial institutions were 
preparing a debt-relief package. The existence of severe corruption 
in the country was no secret. However, the public sector supported 
a soft response and was willing to accept commitments by the 
government to reduce corruption over the long term in exchange 
for immediate debt forgiveness and aid. The prospect of public-
sector carrots and sticks induced most private-sector creditors to 
accept this approach, but Kensington rejected it. Kensington 
advocated a harder line against Congo and, rhetorically, against 
corrupt regimes generally.196 
Using the courts as a platform, and the information obtained 
through litigation as supporting reasons, it advocated a 
fundamentally different normative approach to sovereign debt 
obligations. It framed the soft approach of the official sector as 
promoting theft from the people of Congo and donor-country 
taxpayers. It found allies in transparency NGOs, equipped them 
with the information revealed through discovery, 197 and received 
the UK court’s imprimatur on its assessment of the situation. The 
litigation led to action in the UK Parliament and U.S. Congress.198 
The creditor also kept its perspective salient among financial 
market actors. Coverage by a sovereign investment research firm of 
Congo’s restructuring agreement with private-sector creditors 
exemplifies how litigation supported creditors’ persistent 
 
 194. See Long Beach Ltd. v. Glob. Witness Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB), [47] (Eng.). 
 195. See id. at [49]. 
 196. Friedman, supra note 173. 
 197. Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017). 
 198. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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opposition to the prevailing norm of debt forgiveness despite 
known corruption. An article announcing the country’s bond issue 
was titled, “Congo Debt Deal Fuels Debate: IMF Praises London 
Club Restructuring, but Doubts Raised on the Government’s Use of 
New Funds.”199 The article features laudatory statements by a 
private-sector creditor that participated in the restructuring and by 
the IMF about the government’s handling of the restructuring. But 
those statements are counterweighted by the skepticism of a Global 
Witness representative and a description of the country’s efforts to 
obtain an injunction to block the NGO’s publication of documents 
obtained through litigation by Kensington showing corruption.200 
The Global Witness representative highlighted that information 
revealed by Kensington’s litigation falsified other assurances the 
government gave to the IMF.201 
Sovereigns pursuing counter-reputational strategies against 
holdouts face an additional difficulty when those creditors succeed 
in court. During its disputes with distressed debt funds, Argentina 
disparaged the hedge funds as illegitimate “vultures” and 
eventually expanded its attacks to include U.S. courts and Judge 
Griesa of the Southern District of New York.202 Argentina’s 
sustained attacks on the courts reportedly helped drive the judge 
to fashion the powerful equitable remedy that accompanied the pari 
passu ruling.203 
D. Other Mechanisms 
At least two other informational mechanisms might be at work. 
The first is the ability of litigation to increase the salience of a 
dispute with potential investors and other relevant publics, such as 
those of donor and debtor countries. A sovereign incurs additional 
 
 199. Philip Alexander, Congo Debt Deal Fuels Debate: IMF Praises London Club 
Restructuring, but Doubts Raised on the Government’s Use of New Funds, GLOBAL CAP. (Dec. 13, 
2007), http://www.globalcapital.com/article/yvy2gx7nmh8h/congo-debt-deal-fuels-debate. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Joseph Ax & Andrew Chung, Argentina Threatened with Contempt Order by U.S. 
Judge, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt-idUSKB 
N0G81GB20140809; Economia: “Nuevamente, Griesa llama a una audiencia y no resuelve absolu-
tamente nada” [The Economy: “Once Again, Griesa Calls a Hearing and Resolves Absolutely 
Nothing”], 91.1 FM RADIO SIETE (Sept. 8, 2014), http://radiosiete.com.ar/economia-nueva 
mente-griesa-llama-a-una-audiencia-y-no-resuelve-absolutamente-nada/. 
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reputational costs as the allegations against it are made newly 
salient each time a plaintiff initiates a new action against it or 
succeeds in some phase of litigation. A creditor can use the 
occasions of milestones in litigation to draw renewed media 
attention to a dispute. As a senior sovereign debt lawyer explained, 
 A skillful [plaintiffs’] lawyer will do something that gets a 
front-page headline every six months. This tends to scare 
prospective investors and prospective underwriters. It generally 
lends a sense of being under siege to the country. That will be 
inconsistent with the next Minister of Finance’s desire to portray 
Ruritania as open for business . . . .204 
This mechanism was at work during the holdouts’ relentless 
pursuit of Argentina across continents for years until the state 
finally settled. As another senior sovereign debt lawyer explained, 
[They go] to court to highlight that this is a deadbeat debtor; get a 
judgment against them and publicize it . . . . The creditors knew 
full well that some 15-year-old Argentine frigate is not going to 
help them recover billions of dollars of debt. It got them tons of 
publicity; it was embarrassing.205 
This dynamic might be attributed to an emotional aspect of 
reputation that allows court drama to escalate negative reputa-
tional signals.206 But it is not necessary to resort to emotion-based 
theories to explain why litigation can increase the salience of a 
breach. Litigation has high salience because of the unique 
institutional features of courts discussed above. The “public-ness” 
of courts, especially, gives litigation greater salience, in two senses. 
Courts put information about the dispute into the public domain, 
making it easier for the press and other information disseminators 
to report on the dispute.207 Additionally, much of the public views 
courts as institutions that do, or are supposed to, impartially apply 
widely accepted rules of behavior, determine the truth, and offer 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer II (July 19, 2017). 
 206. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE 
EMOTIONS (1988) (describing how emotions affect reputation apart from objective considerations). 
 207. Email exchange with Felix Salmon (July 28, 2017) (on file with author). 
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recourse for wrongs.208 That perception of the role of courts gives 
their decisions on disputes between particular parties a moral 
weight that makes the public more attentive to judicial pronounce-
ments than it is to pronouncements of other institutions on the 
same dispute. 
A second mechanism is national pride. While standard 
economic theory predicts that the effectiveness of reputation is 
determined by its effect on future transactions, it might also be that 
pride in the standing of one’s nation in the world drives decisions 
about whether to repay creditors. All else equal, this factor could 
cut either in favor of or against repayment. Many observers view 
the temporary arrest in Ghana of an antique Argentine navy frigate 
because of creditors’ actions as a deep wound to Argentine national 
pride.209 Some countries are said to scrupulously repay debts 
because they want to be seen as, and see themselves as, the kind of 
nation that repays debts.210 To the extent this factor is at play, it 
might increase the leverage creditors get by calling debtor nations 
to account for their behavior and embroiling them in litigation in 
courts around the world. 
E. Information Provision as a Public Good 
Norm shaping and the public provision of information relevant 
to third parties are public goods and, therefore, might be expected 
to be underprovided. I use the term “public good” as it is used in 
economic parlance—to refer to things that satisfy human wants and 
are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous—without taking a 
position on whether the shaping of norms by sovereign creditors is 
good as a matter of morality or public policy. One market 
 
 208. See Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences 
and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1639–40 (2015); Tom Tyler 
& Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, 
Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095 (2014); The State of 
State Courts: A 2014 NCSC Public Opinion Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc 
.org/2014survey (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 209. See, e.g., Ed Stocker, Argentina Welcomes Home Ship Held in Ghana by US ‘Vulture Fund,’ 
UK INDEPENDENT (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/Americas/ar 
gentina-welcomes-home-ship-held-in-ghana-by-us-vulture-fund-8445151.html. 
 210. Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie 
eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) (arguing that people desire the moral approbation of 
others and wish to see themselves as worthy of that approval). 
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participant put the point aptly: “They’re not trying to change the 
course of society; they want to get paid.”211 
From the litigating creditor’s point of view, a collective action 
problem might appear in this context as follows: creditors could 
hold their debt and wait for one creditor to litigate to develop the 
law or frame the dispute in a manner that puts pressure on 
sovereigns to settle with creditors. The litigating creditor would 
then not reap the entire benefit of suing and, therefore, might sue 
less often than would be efficient. The potential for free riding is 
greatest in the early phases of litigation, when issues of law and fact 
that are common to multiple creditors have not yet been resolved. 
For example, the champerty issue was an open legal question that, 
once resolved in favor of particular holdouts in early cases, created 
precedent that benefitted other holdouts.212 
This incentive structure is present in litigation generally and is 
not limited to reputation-driven litigation. Several factors mitigate 
the collective action problem in the context of distressed sovereign 
debt. Holding out against sovereign debtors is a high-risk invest-
ment strategy pursued nearly exclusively by a handful of 
specialized investment funds that buy distressed sovereign debt on 
the secondary market. They are long-term, repeat players who have 
incentives to invest in developing the law, establishing their 
reputations as aggressive creditors and reframing sovereign debt 
disputes as contests between corrupt governments and good-faith 
creditors. The expertise required to be a successful distressed 
sovereign debt investor imposes high startup costs to entering the 
market.213 Moreover, many institutional investment funds have 
regulatory incentives and strategy mandates that cause them to sell 
debt that is in default or whose credit rating drops below a certain 
 
 211. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017). 
 212. See discussion, supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017) (“[T]he bulk 
of the market are people who buy, sell, trade, and have mandates or certain funds that say 
things they can and can’t do . . . . The bulk of the market simply does not have the mandate 
to be holdouts.”); Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017); Kate Allen, Venezuela 
Debt Reaches Flashpoint in Political Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com 
/content/2f3beaa0-7c59-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c (quoting fund portfolio manager saying 
“that the due diligence and monitoring needed to keep up to date with the risks” of 
Venezuela’s debt “are excessive” for many emerging market bond investors and that 
distressed debt investors are entering the market for Venezuelan debt). 
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threshold.214 This market structure enables specialized distressed 
debt investors to maintain supernormal profits that counteract the 
collective action problems posed by investing in litigation. 
Additionally, much of the leverage gained by distressed debt 
investors derives from their ability to establish themselves as 
credible “squeaky wheels.” This is especially true in disputes with 
so-called recalcitrant debtors. Some of the most experienced 
sovereign debt litigators explained their approach: 
The strategy that is devised to get payment is not just focused on 
particular assets to be found outside the country at issue but to 
allow the political forces at play within the country to know that 
this is an obligation that needs to be dealt with . . . . that it’s in their 
interest to deal with us rather than to not deal with us.215 
Other creditors who might seek to swoop in when an aggressive 
holdout is on the verge of settling will not have the same credibility 
as entities that must be dealt with. Consider creditors that pursue a 
strategy of uncovering corruption. Their leverage over the 
government is the threat of continuing to pursue discovery through 
enforcement actions that will uncover additional information about 
corruption. The litigating creditor’s past success and demonstrated 
willingness to pursue this strategy aggressively are specific to it. 
Moreover, the creditor might have information it has not made 
public that poses a credible threat of likely further success through 
continued discovery. All of those factors limit the ability of other 
holdouts to free ride on one holdout’s litigation victories. Finally, 
courts have declined to grant relief to free-riding creditors that have 
attempted to collect damages based on the success of holdouts in 
achieving settlement.216 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The account given here of the function of courts in the sovereign 
debt market speaks to debates in the economics literature on 
 
 214. See Partnoy, supra note 122, at 690; Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017). 
 215. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyers III and IV (July 29, 2017). 
 216. See White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Arg., No. 16-cv-1042, 2016 WL 7441699 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) (dismissing action by bondholders that first sued Argentina in 2016, 
when settlement was pending, claiming that the pari passu clause in their bonds entitled them 
to payment along with Argentina’s settlement with the litigating holdout creditors). 
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sovereign debt and offers broader lessons about reputational 
enforcement and the role of courts in dispute resolution.  
A body of research on the economics and law of sovereign debt 
attributes to reputation a dominant role in sustaining the sovereign 
lending market.217 Courts are recognized as playing a marginal role 
as an institution with limited coercive sanctioning power.218 The 
two mechanisms of litigation and reputation are seen as occupying 
separate hemispheres. On this view, creditors rely heavily on 
reputation to incentivize repayment, and they can increase pres-
sure if necessary by layering on legal costs.219 Some scholars of 
sovereign debt have even challenged reputational theories by 
arguing that such theories cannot explain why sovereigns would 
offer creditors recourse to foreign courts.220 
This Article builds on the literature attributing the functioning 
of the sovereign debt market to reputation, while also accounting 
for the market’s observed recourse to the law and courts. Whereas 
reputation and legal enforcement have long been conceived of as 
substitutes or, at most, complements that work through different 
mechanisms, this Article shows that courts can play a key role in 
reputational governance.  
In addition, this Article offers a thicker description of how 
reputation operates in the sovereign debt market. This fuller 
account speaks to additional questions raised in the theoretical and 
empirical literature about whether reputation can really be effective 
in sustaining the observed levels of lending to risky sovereigns. 
Reputational accounts of sovereign lending have been challenged 
on theoretical grounds. One argument is that states that renege on 
their debt can turn to self-insurance. That is, they can use excess 
cash available in good times to buy financial assets and then rely on 
the returns from those assets in bad times. Because sovereigns can 
turn to self-insurance, they have the option of breaching their debt 
contracts and then withdrawing from lending markets.221 Another 
 
 217. See Panizza et al., supra note 1; Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is 
to Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 43 (1989). 
 218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Introduction. 
 219. See Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 1, 14. 
 220. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 56. 
 221. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 6. 
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objection to reputational theories is the possibility that a future 
government might not value access to capital markets.222 Some 
scholars have questioned reputational accounts on empirical 
grounds because some studies have found that defaulting states do 
not face extended exclusion from capital markets or significantly 
higher borrowing rates.223  
The broader account of reputation presented here responds to 
those challenges by showing that the reputation that matters is not 
only reputation with prospective lenders. This account moves 
beyond a unitary model of the state and accounts for a broader set 
of incentives facing the agents of the state who decide whether to 
pay foreign creditors. In addition to capital markets, politicians face 
potential consequences in domestic politics and international 
relations. The existence of multiple relevant social fields populated 
by actors having non-identical preferences increases the options 
available to creditors for exerting reputational pressure, including 
through litigation. 
This Article does not claim that reputation is the sole 
enforcement mechanism in the sovereign debt market. It does not 
argue that the only thing that creditors are seeking or that courts 
are providing in sovereign debt litigation is information that will 
damage the debtor’s reputation. It does not estimate what 
proportion of lending to sovereigns is supported by reputational 
enforcement, what proportion is supported by reputational 
enforcement specifically aided by courts, or what proportion of 
sovereign debt litigation is explained by reputational enforcement. 
What it does is show, through a thick empirical description that 
comports with theoretical predictions, that courts play a pivotal 
role in reputational enforcement in a market that is widely 
recognized to depend heavily on that type of enforcement. It 
thereby sheds new light not only on how sovereign debt markets 
function but also on how reputation operates and how courts 
influence behavior in markets. 
Contracts scholars have studied an array of cases in which 
close-knit communities and industries characterized by repeat play 
function because of reputational enforcement. As these informal 
 
 222. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 55. 
 223. See Tomz & Wright, supra note 46, at 247, 260–61. 
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economic exchange networks become more complex, reputation is 
sometimes supported by private arbitration based on rules chosen 
by industry players. The case of sovereign debt illustrates that 
reputation supported by a legal adjudicator can work in an 
additional set of cases. The case study presented here suggests a 
framework for assessing the likely effectiveness of courts as 
reputation intermediaries in a given market or social field. Courts 
will tend to be effective as information intermediaries when 
information dissemination costs are low, the economic costs of 
reputational damage are high, and verification costs are high but 
are relatively lower for courts than for other information 
intermediaries. Additionally, the value at stake must be sufficiently 
high to render a non-breaching party’s threat to litigate credible. 
Those general criteria can be made more specific. Adjudication 
without enforcement is more likely to be an effective form of 
governance when market participants are less anonymous, have 
longer time horizons, have more homogeneous preferences, and 
are subject to greater reputation spillover effects. The ability of 
courts to provide information relevant to actors in multiple social 
fields in which market participants operate increases their 
effectiveness as reputation intermediaries. So does the ability of 
courts to produce information that is central to the concerns of third 
parties, with the power to sanction or refuse to deal with a 
breaching party, where those third parties are not particularly 
concerned about the breach that forms the core of the dispute.224 
This latter capacity becomes more important as the preferences of 
prospective transactors become more heterogeneous. 
Are there things that can be done to expand or contract the 
scope of governance by reputation through adjudication? A first 
step toward increasing the scope of reputation adjudication in 
commercial transactions would be to increase the transparency of 
dispute resolution. Policymakers and scholars have raised concerns 
about the secrecy of arbitration. But state and federal courts decide 
a large percentage of matters—as many as ninety-seven percent—
 
 224. In the sovereign debt context, courts have produced information about corruption 
that hurt government officials’ reputation with third parties that were not sympathetic to the 
creditors’ claims. See supra notes 158–183 and accompanying text. 
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without publishing reasoned decisions.225 One way lawmakers 
could increase the potential scope of reputational enforcement 
mediated by courts is by requiring courts to publish decisions. 
Lawyers and regulators can increase the salience of judicial 
decisions through public relations efforts. However, there are limits 
to this approach, including the attention spans of the press and the 
public. Some matters attract more attention than others. None-
theless, a long-term strategy of cultivating public concern about an 
issue, together with litigation, might hold promise for shaping 
behavior where existing legal remedies are weak. 
Conversely, perhaps policymakers should be more concerned 
about overdeterrence from litigation’s reputation effects. Others 
have observed that, when calibrating remedies, policy makers 
should account for reputational effects.226 This case study offers 
insights into how policy makers might analyze the reputational 
impact of litigation and other forms of dispute resolution that 
release public information about disputing parties. 
Finally, the analysis presented in this paper has implications for 
law and development. The global development establishment has 
embraced a diagnosis of ineffective or absent contract enforcement 
institutions as the leading cause of economic underdevelopment. 
Law reform efforts frequently seek to implement Western-style, 
formalistic, judicially backed contract institutions.227 There has 
been controversy among scholars and practitioners of law and 
development about the ability to import Western-style legal 
institutions into non-Western countries. Such efforts might fail 
because, among other reasons, they conflict with local norms and 
social structures. While the analysis presented in this paper does 
not offer a specific prescription for law and development practice, 
it suggests that law reformers seeking to promote economic 
development might realize their goal of lowering contracting risk 
 
 225. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. 
REV. 973, 988 (2008); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in 
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2004). 
 226. See ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING 
TORTS, CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 187–206 (2014). 
 227. Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and 
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 900–03 (2008); Michael 
Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic 
Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006). 
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by tapping into existing local social networks. Institutions that 
employ court-like information-producing features might raise the 
cost of breaching contracts even without conventional Western-
style enforcement mechanisms.  	  
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY 
The reputational theory of sovereign debt litigation emerged 
from the observation of published information about the sovereign 
debt market and related litigation. Published sources included 
sovereign bond indentures; judicial decisions; scholarly accounts of 
the market and related litigation; the documentation of relevant 
institutions such as credit rating agencies, trade associations, and 
multilateral public-sector lenders; and press reports.228 I interpreted 
the information from those sources in light of the assumption that 
the sophisticated actors in this context are instrumentally rational. 
I assume, for instance, that investors seek to maximize the value of 
their investments and that they pursue litigation in service of that 
end. Public information about sovereign debt disputes suggests 
that courts might serve a reputational function that holdout 
creditors view as a means of increasing the returns on their 
investments. Sophisticated professionals might be expected to be 
conscious of and able to articulate the strategies they and their 
organizations pursue to achieve their ends. 
Therefore, to check the fit of the reputational theory, I identified 
interview subjects using a supplemented snowball sampling 
method.229 The sample is not random or statistically representative. 
I sought instead to interview people with experience in each role I 
had identified as being important to the functioning of reputational 
enforcement in this context.230 I sought to ascertain whether the 
professionals’ accounts of their actions and decision-making 
processes, and those of the organizations they represented, com-
ported with the theory. As I learned more about how reputation 
functions in this market, about information being provided by 
courts and other sources, and about how people and organizations 
 
 228. For a description of the method of building theory from cases, see Kathleen M. 
Eisenhardt & Melissa E. Graebner, Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges, 50 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 25 (2007). 
 229. In snowball sampling, earlier interview subjects recommend others for future 
interviews who have the characteristics of interest for the research. JOHN LOFLAND, DAVID 
SNOW, LEON ANDERSON & LYN H. LOFLAND, ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO 
QUALITATIVE OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 43 (4th ed. 2006). I combined snowball sampling 
with targeted searches for professionals having experience in relevant roles. 
 230. Such “purposeful sampling” is appropriate for selecting people who know about 
the phenomenon of interest, especially where that phenomenon plays out among a small, 
specialized social group. See JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING AND 
CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS RESEARCH (2d ed. 2011). 
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were using that information, I expanded the categories of profes-
sional experience from which to seek interview subjects. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty profes-
sionals with substantial experience in one of the following activi-
ties: advising on sovereign creditworthiness or on whether to buy 
or sell sovereign debt; deciding whether to buy or sell sovereign 
debt; deciding whether and how to invest in the territory of a 
sovereign debtor; suing a sovereign debtor; deciding whether to 
sue a sovereign debtor; issuing or restructuring sovereign debt; 
advising on transactions with foreign sovereigns; or providing 
information about sovereign behavior through an official multi-
lateral institution, the press, a trade association, or a non-govern-
mental public interest organization. 
Interviews were conducted confidentially to encourage forth-
rightness, unless the interviewee requested attribution. Interviews 
were typically forty-five minutes to one hour long, though one was 
thirty minutes, and several were over an hour. To mitigate the 
accuracy limits of interview research, where possible I triangulated 
information obtained from interviews with other sources, includ-
ing other interviews and publicly available information. The 
descriptions I use to identify the interview subjects balance offering 
enough detail to show the basis for their knowledge with protecting 
their confidentiality. To further protect interviewees’ confidential-
ity, I use male pronouns for all interview subjects. 
 
